American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 27
Issue 5 Symposium Edition

Article 5

2019

Mitigating the "LGBT Disconnect": Title IX's Protection of
Transgender Students, Birth Certificate Correction Statutes, and
the Transformative Potential of Connecting the Two
Kyle Velte
University of Kansas, kvelte@ku.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Law and Gender Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Velte, Kyle (2019) "Mitigating the "LGBT Disconnect": Title IX's Protection of Transgender Students, Birth
Certificate Correction Statutes, and the Transformative Potential of Connecting the Two," American
University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law: Vol. 27 : Iss. 5 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss5/5

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law
Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Velte: Mitigating the "LGBT Disconnect": Title IX's Protection of Transg

MITIGATING THE “LGBT
DISCONNECT”: TITLE IX’S
PROTECTION OF TRANSGENDER
STUDENTS, BIRTH CERTIFICATE
CORRECTION STATUTES, AND THE
TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF
CONNECTING THE TWO
1

KYLE C. VELTE*
“Bathroom inequality is one of the greatest barriers to full integration of
transgender people in American life.”2

Introduction ........................................................................................ 31
I. Let’s Talk about Sex, Baby. And Gender. And Gender Identity. .... 36
A. Terminology ..................................................................... 36
B. The Origins of Gender Identity ........................................ 38
C. Transitioning and the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria .... 39
D. The Experiences of Transgender Children ....................... 40
1. SOC for Transgender Youth ....................................... 40
2. Transgender K-12 Students Face Hostile School
Environments .............................................................. 42
3. A Note on this Article’s Proposals Considering the
Data on Transgender Youth ........................................ 45
II. Where Are We Now? The Current Legal Landscape for Birth
Certificate Correction and Transgender Claims Under Title
1. See Marie-Amelie George, The LGBT Movement Disconnect: Politics and Perils
of Legal Movement Formation, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 503, 503 (2018).
*
Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School;
J.D., American University Washington College of Law. Many thanks to the University
of Kansas School of Law for its support of my scholarship and to Marie-Amelie George
for her thoughtful feedback on an earlier draft of the piece.
2. See Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom
Equality, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 133 (2010).

29

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019

1

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 5

30

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27

IX ............................................................................................. 46
A. The Importance of Identity Documents ............................ 46
B. Birth Certificate Correction: The Current Legal
Landscape ......................................................................... 48
C. Accessing Gender-Segregated Facilities in K-12 Schools52
1. Sex-Segregated Facilities: A Note on Origins ............ 52
2. The Importance of Restroom Access .......................... 53
D. The Current Legal Landscape for K-12 Transgender
Students ............................................................................ 53
1. Title IX ........................................................................ 53
2. Constitutional Equal Protection .................................. 58
3. State Antidiscrimination Law ..................................... 62
4. School District Policies ............................................... 63
III. The Surgical Requirement Is Counterfactual, Unconstitutional,
Unlawful, and Unethical .......................................................... 63
A. Modern Science Demonstrates that the Surgical
Requirement is Counterfactual ......................................... 64
B. Addressing the Four State Interests .................................. 64
C. The Surgical Requirement Violates the First
Amendment ...................................................................... 68
1. The Surgical Requirement Violates the Right to Refrain
from Speaking and the Right to Be Free from
Endorsing a Government Message ............................. 68
2. The Surgical Requirement Violates the Right to
Expressive Conduct .................................................... 70
D. Due Process ...................................................................... 72
1. The Surgical Requirement Violates the Substantive
Due Process Rights to Liberty, Dignity, Bodily
Autonomy, Gender Autonomy, and Privacy ............... 72
a. Liberty and Dignity .............................................. 72
b. Bodily Autonomy ................................................. 75
c. Privacy ................................................................. 75
2. The Surgical Requirement Violates Equal Protection
Based on Sex and Based on Transgender Status ........ 78
E. State Antidiscrimination Law ........................................... 79
F. Informed Consent & Biomedical Ethics........................... 79
G. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine ....................... 80
H. Title IX, Transgender Students, and Corrected Birth
Certificates........................................................................ 82
IV. Mitigating the LGBT Disconnect Through Formal Identity ........ 82
A. The Strategic Benefits of a Coalition ............................... 83
B. Collaboration and Coalition-Building: Avoiding Further

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss5/5

2

Velte: Mitigating the "LGBT Disconnect": Title IX's Protection of Transg

2019]

MITIGATING THE "LGBT DISCONNECT"

31

Disconnect in the LGBT Civil Rights Movement ............ 84
C. “Formal Identity” Is a Beneficial Common Goal ............. 89
D. A Note on the Scope of this Proposal ............................... 93
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 94
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, transgender Americans have become more visible, thanks
to the work of the transgender community and LGBT-rights organizations;
as well as the emergence of transgender celebrities such as Laverne Cox,
Chaz Bono, and Caitlyn Jenner in popular culture and the media.3 One result
of this increased visibility is the greater number of children coming out as
transgender.4 With more openly transgender children and adolescents,
schools are tasked with creating safe and inclusive learning spaces for
transgender youth—a task that often proves difficult given political hostility
grounded in transphobia.5
3. See Vincent J. Samar, The Right to Privacy and the Right to Use the Bathroom
Consistent with One’s Gender Identity, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 33, 41-42 (2016)
(describing the proliferation of transgender rights groups in the 1990s and the 2000s, and
the emergence of “openly transgender celebrities like Chaz Bono, bureaucrats in
agencies such the United States Department of Commerce, state legislators, West Point
graduates, NCAA basketball players, and Texas’ first openly elected transgender judge,
Phyllis Frye . . . This period . . . also witnessed Olympic gold medalist Bruce Jenner
come out as Caitlyn Jenner on national television.”).
4. See Dianna Felberbaum, Boys Will Be Girls, and Girls Will Be Boys: Urging the
Supreme Court to Recognize a Transgender Student’s Right to Use the Appropriate
Facilities in a Federally Funded School, 33 TOURO L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2017); see also
Harper Jean Tobin & Jennifer Levi, Securing Equal Access to Sex-Segregated Facilities
for Transgender Students, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 301, 302-03 (2013) (“With
increased awareness, acceptance, and support from parents and clinicians, there has been
‘a rapid increase’ in the number of children and adolescents presenting for treatment and
socially transitioning. Thus, more and more students in elementary and secondary
schools are undergoing or have undergone social role transition and are attending school
in their affirmed gender.”); Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender Expression
as Protected Speech in the Modern Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 89,
92 (2015) (“In recent years, transgender children as young as five and six years old have
grabbed the attention of the media . . . . Despite the societal expectations resulting from
their physiological and anatomical presentation, young children are bravely claiming
their own gender identity and pushing social norms to their limits.”). See generally
TRANSGENDER LAW CTR, BEYOND THE BINARY: A TOOL KIT FOR GENDER IDENTITY
ACTIVISM IN SCHOOLS 6 (2004), http://translaw.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/07/99640173-Beyond-the-Binary.pdf
5. See Samar, supra note 3, at 42 (noting that the flood of “bathroom bills”
introduced or passed in recent years “opens the door, if it hasn’t been opened already, to
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With this greater visibility of transgender adults and youth alike,
discrimination faced by transgender people has also been illuminated. Such
discrimination exists in many areas of life, including employment, housing,
education, health, identity documents, immigration, and access to public
accommodation.6 National organizations focusing on lesbian and gay civil
rights have existed since the 1970s.7 However, it was not until the 1990s and
into the early 2000s that gay and lesbian organizations broadened their
agendas to include transgender issues and transgender-specific civil rights
organizations were born.8 This increased visibility has led LGBT-rights
organizations to develop strategies—from community-based to nationally
focused—to fight against rampant discrimination.
Two of these recent, important legal reform movements are the subject of
this Article: (1) legal challenges to identity document correction laws in
those states that require Gender Confirmation Surgery (GCS),9 including
governmental discrimination against transgender people across many more states,
especially in the ‘Bible belt’ where religion and private sector discrimination often
oppose transgender rights.”).
6. See Anne E. Silver, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Coercing Consent to Surgery
Through the Medicalization of Gender Identity, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 488, 493-94
(2014); see also JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L
GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 1, 32-174 (2011), https://www.ncgs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/Injustice-at-Every-Turn-A-Report-of-the-NationalTransgender-Discrimination-Survey.pdf. See generally GLAAD, UNDERSTANDING
ISSUES FACING TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 8-9 (2015), http://www.glaad.org/sites/
default/files/understanding-issues-facing-transgender-americans.pdf.
7. See Timeline of LGBT Organizations, EQUALDEX, https://www.equaldex.com/
organizations/timeline (last visited July 22, 2018) (noting that the 1970s saw the creation
of Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG), Lambda Legal, the
National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and Gay &
Lesbian Advocates and Defenders).
8. See George, supra note 1, at 535-39 (stating that the first national transgender
rights organization, the Transgender Law Center, was founded in 2002); see also
Timeline of LGBT Organizations, supra note 7 (asserting that the National Center for
Transgender Equality and the Transgender Legal Defense & Education Fund were
founded in 2003).
9. See Gender Confirmation Surgery, MICH. MED., https://www.uofmhealth.org/
conditions-treatments/gender-confirmation-surgery (last visited July 23, 2018) (stating
that gender confirmation surgery, as used in this Article, was formerly known as “sex
reassignment surgery” or “SRS” and is genital sex reassignment, known as penile
inversion vaginoplasty for male-to-female transgender people and as phalloplasty for
female-to-male transgender people.); see also Loren S. Schechter, ‘Gender Confirmation
Surgery’: What’s in a Name?, HUFFINGTON POST https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
loren-s-schechter-md-facs/gender-confirmation-surgery_b_1442262.html (last updated
Feb. 6, 2018) (explaining use of the term “gender confirmation surgery”; “gender
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laws regarding the correction of birth certificates,10 and (2) Title IX actions
asserted by K-12 students seeking to use sex-segregated facilities,
particularly restrooms, that align with their gender identity.11 While scholars
have analyzed and theorized about these issues separately,12 this project is
confirming surgery” or “gender affirming surgery” and connotes any number of surgical
procedures that a transgender person may chose during their transition); Genny Beemyn,
Transgender
Terminology,
U.
MASS
STONEWALL
CENTER,
https://hr.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/trans%20terms.pdf (last visited July 23, 2018).
10. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, B.D. v. State, no. 2179401 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 24,
2018) [hereinafter Complain, B.D.]; Complaint at 4-13, Corbitt v. Taylor, No. 2:18-cv91-MHT-GMB (N.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Complaint, Corbitt] (challenging
Alabama’s regulation concerning gender marker changes on driver’s licenses); Petition
for Judicial Review at 1, Mott v. Kansas Dep’t of Health & Env’t, 2016-cv-000150 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. Feb. 19, 2016) (challenging Kansas’s refusal to correct birth certificates of
transgender people); Complaint at 1, Ray v. Himes, No. 2:18-cv-00272-MHW-CMV
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Complaint, Ray] (challenging Ohio’s refusal to
correct birth certificates of transgender people).
11. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir.
2017); Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730 (E.D. Va. 2018); see
also M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704 (D. Md. 2018). The
phrase “gender-affirming restroom” used throughout this Article to refer to use by a
transgender student of a sex-segregated facility that aligns with the student’s gender
identity. In addition, this Article focuses on K-12 public schools and does not include
discussion of the Title IX issues in private K-12 schools, religious schools, or colleges
and universities.
12. See, e.g., Jason Allen, A Quest for Acceptance: The Real ID Act and the Need
for Comprehensive Gender Recognition Legislation in the United States, 14 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 169 (2008) (finding that there is a robust body of legal scholarship
addressing identity documents generally and birth certificates specifically); Annette
Appell, Certifying Gender, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361 (2014); Amy Ballard, Sex Change:
Changing the Face of Transgender Policy in the United States, 18 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 775 (2012); Shelby Hanssen, Beyond Male or Female: Using Nonbinary
Gender Identity to Confront Outdated Notions of Sex and Gender in the Law, 96 OR. L.
REV. 283 (2017); Jenna Johnson, Minnesota (Trans)Gender Markers: State Statutes and
Policies on Amending Identity Documents, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 213 (2015); M.
Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect Modern
Medical Science if Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943 (2015); Lisa Mottet,
Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender
Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives
of Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373 (2013); Stephanie Markowitz,
Change of Sex Designation on Transsexuals’ Birth Certificates: Public Policy and Equal
Protection, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 705 (2008); Saru Matambanadzo, Engendering
Sex: Birth Certificates, Biology and the Body in Anglo American Law, 12 CARDOZO J.L.
& GENDER 213 (2005); Amy Rappole, Trans People and Legal Recognition: What the
U.S. Federal Government Can Learn from Foreign Nations, 30 MD. J. INT’L LAW 191
(2015); Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 734 (2008); Brian T.
Ruocco, Our Antitotalitarian Constitution and the Right to Identity, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
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the first to unite them.
Currently, seventeen states require GCS before one may correct the gender
marker on one’s birth certificate.13 Three additional states do not permit the
correction of a gender marker on a birth certificate under any circumstance.14
While there are pending cases challenging some of these states’ policies,
there is little scholarship that takes a comprehensive analysis of the
constitutional deficiencies of these policies, namely Due Process, Equal
Protection, and First Amendment issues. This Article builds on existing
scholarship to offer that comprehensive doctrinal analysis.
The birth certificate correction issue intersects directly with the Title IX
issue of transgender students’ access to gender-affirming, sex-segregated
facilities. In a recent Wisconsin Title IX case, the defendant school district
argued that the transgender student would be prohibited from using a genderaffirming restroom unless he could provide “legal or medical

193, 196 (2016); Silver, supra note 6; Kristin Wenstrom, What the Birth Certificate
Shows: An Argument to Remove Surgical Requirements from Birth Certificate
Amendment Policies, 17 LAW & SEXUALITY 131 (2008); Anna James Neuman Wipfler,
Identity Crisis: The Limitations of Expanding Government Recognition of Gender
Identity Documents and the Possibility of Genderless Identity Documents, 39 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 491 (2016); Catherine Jean Archibald, Transgender Bathroom Rights, 24
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2016); Erin Buzuvis, “On the Basis of Sex”: Using Title
IX to Protect Transgender Students from Discrimination in Education, 28 WISC. J.L.
GENDER & SOC’Y 219 (2013); Victoria L. Buzzelli, Transforming Transgender Rights in
Schools: Protection from Discrimination Under Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 187 (2016); Dianna Felberbaum, supra note 4; see also
Nathan Heffernan, Potty Politics: G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School
Board, Title IX, and the Challenges Faced by Transgender Students Under the Trump
Administration and Beyond, 32 WISC. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 215 (2017); Alanna M.
Jereb, The Bathroom Right for Transgender Students and How the Entire LGBT
Community Can Align to Guarantee This, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 585 (2017);
Mudasar Khan, et al., Challenges Facing LGBT Youth, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 475
(2017); Marisa Pogofsky, Transgender Persons Have a Fundamental Right to Use
Public Bathrooms Matching Their Gender Identity, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 733 (2018);
Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 302-303; Jillian T. Weiss, Protecting Transgender
Students: Application of Title IX to Gender Identity or Expression and the Constitutional
Right to Gender Autonomy, 28 WISC. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 331 (2013); Sam
Williamson, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board: Broadening Title
IX’s Protections for Transgender Students, 76 MD. L. REV. 1102 (2017) (noting that legal
scholarship has addressed the issue of K-12 transgender students’ access to sexsegregated facilities under Title IX).
13. See Identity Document Laws and Policies, MOVEMENT ADVANCE PROJECT,
www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/identity_document_laws (last visited July 23, 2018).
14. Id.
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documentation.”15 The availability of a corrected birth certificate would
have satisfied the school district’s requirement; however, because GCS is
unavailable to minors, surgical requirements preclude school-aged students
from obtaining the surgery necessary to correct their birth certificate.16 In
other words, it is impossible for transgender K-12 students to satisfy the
surgical requirements to correct their birth certificates that are mandated by
many states.
There is thus a synergy between the challenges to GCS-required birth
certificate policies and the availability of Title IX relief for transgender
students regarding the use of sex-segregated facilities. Until now, there has
been little or no crossover, in terms of advocacy or organizing, between these
two movements. On the issue of facilities access for transgender K-12
students, the path of least resistance—and thus speedy and complete relief—
is the presentation of a corrected birth certificate to school officials. This is
because most schools rely on the sex assigned at birth (and thus indicated on
the birth certificate), rather than on the student’s gender identity, to decide
which sex-segregated facilities the student must use. Thus, an analysis of
the surgical requirement issue alongside a Title IX analysis is helpful in
illuminating the path to relief for these students.
A failure by the LGBT-rights movement to recognize and capitalize on
this synergy may exacerbate what Professor Marie-Amelie George calls the
“LGBT disconnect”—the phenomenon through which “lesbian, gay, and
transgender rights are sufficiently disconnected that many Americans are
willing to accept the former (LG) and not the latter (T), and yet the two are
integrated enough that one can be deployed against the other.”17
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the concepts of sex,
gender, and gender identity, as well as the importance of identity documents
in the lives of transgender adults and students. Part II summarizes the legal
landscape for both movements. Part III builds on existing scholarship and
advocacy to create a comprehensive framework for challenging the surgical
15. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1041.
16. See E. COLEMAN, ET AL., WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR

TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL,
TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 17-21 (7th ed., 2011), https://
www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/Web%20Transfer/SOC/Standards%20of%20
Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH.pdf (hereinafter WPATH SOC) Many, if not
most, physicians will not perform GCS on a minor child. In fact, the World Professional
Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), which disseminates standards of care
(SOC) for treating transgender youth, adolescents, and adults, recommends that GCS
only be performed on adults who have lived consistent with their gender identity for at
least one year.
17. See generally George, supra note 1, at 506.
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requirement, and ties that to the Title IX movement. Finally, Part IV presents
a proposal to advance the interests of both transgender K-12 schoolchildren
and transgender adults challenging surgical requirements for correcting
identity documents.
I.

LET’S TALK ABOUT SEX, BABY. AND GENDER. AND GENDER
IDENTITY.
A. Terminology

In a world where sex and gender are often conflated and where gender
identity often is misunderstood, it is important to begin with a brief
definitional overview.
Sex is most often determined at birth and is based on biology, often solely
using external indicators, particularly, genitalia: people born with a penis are
assigned “male” as their sex and people born with a vagina are assigned
“female” as their sex.18 Sex based on genitalia is the basis for “legal sex”—
the “M” or “F” on a person’s birth certificate.19 The essentialism of legal
sex—boiling sex down to one factor (external genitalia at birth)—stands in
stark contrast to the determination of sex by medical professionals, who
consider a variety of factors before declaring someone’s biological sex.20 In
medicine, “there is no simple or singular test for biological sex[,]”21
rendering law’s construction of legal sex incorrect as a matter of fact and
thus flawed as a matter of law and policy. The flawed construction of legal
sex is exacerbated by the fact that it fails to recognize that one’s legal sex
may not align with one’s gender identity.22
Gender is the socially constructed persona and identity associated with
18. See generally Silver, supra note 6, at 490. Other biologically-based
characteristics of one’s sex include hormone levels, internal reproductive organs,
chromosomes, and gender identity. See also Samar, supra note 3, at 37 (noting the
distinction between sex and gender: “the former is usually concerned with biological
anatomy or chromosomes, the latter with cultural identity”); Complaint, B.D., supra note
10, at 4; See Jessica Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747 (2015).
19. See generally Silver, supra note 6, at 490.
20. Id. at 490-91 (“By contrast, medical experts determine biological sex in a much
more nuanced fashion by looking to a number of biological factors, including genetic or
chromosomal sex (XX or XY); gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands); internal
morphological sex (prostate, seminal vesicles, vagina, uterus, and fallopian tubes);
external morphological sex (genitalia); hormonal sex; and phenotypic sex (secondary sex
characteristics). Some experts also include assigned sex or gender of rearing and gender
identity as part of the inquiry into biological sex.”) (internal citations omitted).
21. See id. at 491.
22. See id.
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sex.23 Because gender is the social and cultural manifestation of sex—the
“beliefs, feelings, and behaviors that a specific culture attributes to
individuals based on their perceived sex”24—the two are often conflated,
notwithstanding that they are conceptually different.
Gender identity is the internal knowledge of one’s gender.25 It is the
deeply held, intrinsic understanding of the gender to which one belongs26—
an “individual’s sense of being male, female, or something else.”27
Most often, one’s sex assigned at birth and one’s gender identity are
congruent—a person born with a vagina and assigned the sex “female” at
birth grows up with the intrinsic feeling of being a girl, i.e., with a female
gender identity.28 Cisgender is the term for a person whose sex assigned at
birth and gender identity match.29 Trans Student Resource Center defines
transgender as a “term for people whose gender identity differs from the sex
they were assigned at birth.”30
“Gender dysphoria” is the clinical diagnosis applied to transgender people
who suffer from anxiety or other negative mental health symptoms because
of the mismatch between their gender identity and their sex assigned at
birth.31 Importantly, being a transgender person is not, standing alone, an
illness or pathology; many transgender people do not suffer any anxiety or
negative health outcomes because they are transgender.32 However, those
that do suffer—often because of the discrimination and ostracization they
face from others—receive the gender dysphoria diagnosis.33 This diagnosis
is controversial within the transgender community; a diagnosis remains a
prerequisite for medical transition, but many disagree with the message that
such a diagnosis sends, namely the pathologizing of being transgender,

23. See id.
24. See Beemyn, supra note 9.
25. See Frequently Asked Questions About Transgender People, NAT’L CTR. FOR

TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (July 9, 2016), https://transequality.org/issues/resources/
frequently-asked-questions-about-transgender-people.
26. See id.
27. See Beemyn, supra note 9.
28. See Janet Dolgin, Discriminating Gender: Legal, Medical, and Social
Presumptions about Transgender and Intersex People, 47 SW. L. REV. 61, 65 (2017).
29. See LGBTQ+ Definitions, TRANS STUDENTS EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES,
http://www.transstudent.org/definitions/ (last visited July 23, 2018).
30. Id.
31. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 25.
32. See id.
33. See id.
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which is just one of many gender identities.34
B. The Origins of Gender Identity
Recent scientific research reveals that gender identity is informed by a
myriad of factors, not just a person’s genitalia. One scholar describes the
advances that modern science has made in understanding sex and its
connection to gender identity:
It is in the brain that individual identity lies, and indeed, gender
identity. Scientists aided by powerful imaging technologies have
discovered that that there are slight, but noticeable differences in
brain structure between the male and female brain. Scientists have
also discovered that transgender individuals, both before and after
hormone therapy, have brains that correspond more to their
identified gender than to their genetic or anatomic sex . . . Gender
is truly between the ears, not between the legs.35
Sometimes referred to as “brain sex,”36 it is beyond dispute that gender
identity is fixed at birth and has a biological basis.37 The most recent
research suggests that the biological underpinnings of gender identity are
strongly influenced by the prenatal environment—specifically the exposure
of the developing brain to particular hormones.38 This research has
transformative potential:
The significance of these studies is hard to understate: if
neurological structures in the brain are sexually dimorphic, and if
transgender individuals have neurological structures in their brain
that correspond to the opposite sex, then transgender individuals are
arguably . . . neurologically intersex. Phrased as “neurological
34. See id.
35. See Blaise Vanderhorst, Whither Lies the Self: Intersex and Transgender

Individuals and a Proposal for Brain-Based Legal Sex, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 241,
244-45 (2015).
36. See id.; see also Levasseur, supra note 12, at 955-56 (“Gender identity is also
referred to as the ‘brain sex’ because it is hardwired in the brain . . . . Gender identity ‘is
not subject to voluntary control and cannot be changed by therapy or other means.’”)
(internal citations omitted).
37. See Vanderhorst, supra note 35, at 259-60.
38. See id. (“Research into the sexual dimorphism of the human brain has shown that
several distinct regions of the brain in transgender individuals—both transmen and
transwomen, including those who have yet to undergo hormone therapy—are more alike
in structure to the brains of members of their identified gender than those of their
genetic/anatomical sex. Some research has indicated hormone-mediated sexual
differentiation of the genitals and the brain occur during different stages of pregnancy,
which would explain how otherwise non-intersexual individuals could develop
neurological features more like those of the opposite sex.”).
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intersexuality,” transgenderism is removed from the realm of
mental health completely, and placed into the purview of pure
physical medicine. Further, a neurological basis for gender identity
establishes it as an innate trait, which would then facilitate greater
legal protection for transgender individuals.39
The conclusion to be drawn from these studies is that “sex” should be
defined and determined by one’s gender identity. Thus, for all people,
including transgender people, gender identity must carry the day in
determining someone’s sex, rather than sex assigned at birth based on
external genitalia.40 Relying on gender identity rather than sex assigned at
birth is critical for people to live integrated, whole, and psychologically
healthy lives, and, for children, to academic success.41 In short, gender
identity is what constitutes a person’s sex, whether you are a transgender
person or a cisgender person, and the law should reflect that reality.
C. Transitioning and the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria
Internationally-accepted standards of care govern the treatment of gender
dysphoria. The World Professional Association for Transgender Health
(WPATH) was established in 1979 with the core mission of understanding
transgenderism and treating transgender people.42 Relying on current
medical and scientific knowledge, WPATH writes and disseminates
standards of care (SOC).43 Those SOC include a protocol known as
“transition” as the best practice for transgender people, including those with
a gender dysphoria diagnosis. Social transition is the process in which a
transgender person begins living their daily lives as the gender that aligns
with their gender identity; thus, a transgender woman in social transition
would begin dressing more femininely and be addressed by a name
commonly associated with girls and women.44
Medical transition encompasses steps such as hormone therapy and
39. See id., at 260.
40. See Levasseur, supra note 12, at 947 (arguing that “of the multiple factors

determining sex, gender identity must be given the most weight because it is, in fact,
‘biological’ and considered the primary determinant of an individual’s sex.”).
41. See Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 306 (noting that for students who have socially
transitioned, “living and participating in school as their affirmed gender is essential to
their psychological well-being and academic success.”).
42. See Mottet, supra note 12, at 405.
43. See WPATH SOC, supra note 16, at 1.
44. See generally What do I need to know about transitioning? PLANNED
PARENTHOOD https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/sexual-orientation-gender/trans
-and-gender-nonconforming-identities/what-do-i-need-know-about-transitioning (last
visited July 23, 2018); see also Mottet, supra note 12, at 388.
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surgery.45 A variety of surgical treatments exist, ranging from a mastectomy
for a transgender man, to laser hair removal for a transgender woman. Only
a small percentage of transgender people undergo GCS.46 Critically, not all
transgender people desire surgical treatment, nor are all transgender people
who desire surgical treatment medically eligible or able to afford it.47 As a
result, it is not necessary for a person to undergo any surgical procedures to
be accurately considered the sex other than the sex they were assigned at
birth.48 Put another way, a transgender man is a man, and a transgender
woman is a woman, even if they undergo no surgical procedures. This
conclusion that surgical transition is unnecessary for a successful transition
or for the successful treatment of gender dysphoria is widely accepted.49
Legal transition is the process of legally changing one’s sex/gender marker
on the litany of forms and documents required by the administrative state,
such as on one’s birth certificate, driver’s license, passport, social security
card, and the like.50 It also often includes a legal change of the person’s first
name.51
D. The Experiences of Transgender Children
With the increased visibility of transgender people over the past decade,
children are coming out as transgender earlier than in past generations.52
1.

SOC for Transgender Youth

There are different protocols for the treatment of transgender children,
adolescents, and adults.53
Gender identity becomes stable in most people between the ages of three
and four.54 There is scant empirical evidence that transgender adolescents
and adults revert to a gender identity consistent with their sex assigned at
birth.55 With regard to pre-adolescent transgender children who persistently
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See generally PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 44.
See Mottet, supra note 12, at 407.
See id. at 407-08.
See id. at 409.
See id. at 407.
See LGBTQIA Resource Center Glossary, UC DAVIS, https://lgbtqia.
ucdavis.edu/educated/glossary.html (last visited July 23, 2018).
51. See id.
52. See Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 302-03.
53. See WPATH SOC, supra note 16, at 110-11.
54. See Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and Gender
Nonconforming People, 70 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 834 (2015) [hereinafter Guidelines].
55. See id. See also Clarke, supra note 18, at 823. But see Jesse Singal, When
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assert a gender identity different from the sex assigned at birth, there is
increasing evidence that these children are more likely to continue living
according to their gender identity into adolescence.56 While there is some
data suggesting that 12 percent to 50 percent of children with gender
dysphoria do not continue along that path into adolescence and adulthood,
“this research runs a strong risk of inflating estimates of the number of youth
who do not persist with a [transgender] identity.”57 Given the current status
of the data, there is no consensus within the psychological community
regarding best practices for treating and supporting prepubertal transgender
children,58 and there are strong opinions on both sides.59 One approach
advocates accepting and affirming the gender identity expressed by a child
and thus assisting the child in social transition, while a second advocates
encouraging the child to align their gender identity to their given bodies.60
WPATH, however, has decried the second approach (aligning gender
identity with body at birth) as unethical.61 A third approach is an affirm-butwait-and-see approach, in which children questioning their gender identity
work with a supportive therapist to explore their gender identity but proceed

Children Say They’re Trans, THE ATLANTIC (July 2018), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/when-a-child-says-shes-trans/561749/.
56. See Guidelines, supra note 54, at 842 (noting that individuals who do not persist
in expressing a gender identity different from their sex assigned at birth are more likely
to identify as lesbian or gay than children whose gender identity always aligned with
their sex at birth).
57. See id.; see also, Zinnia Jones, When “Desisters” Aren’t: De-Desistance in
Childhood and Adolescent Gender Dysphoria, GENDER ANALYSIS, https://
genderanalysis.net/2017/10/when-desisters-arent-de-desistance-in-childhood-andadolescent-gender-dysphoria/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). Those children who identify as
transgender then, later in adolescence or adulthood, realize that they are, in fact,
cisgender, are knowns as “desisters,” while those children who continue to identify as
transgender into adulthood are known as “persisters.” Id. In addition, a new study has
revealed a phenomenon known as “rapid onset ender dysphoria,” in which gender
dysphoria appears suddenly at adolescence and may or may not persist. See Lisa Littman,
Rapid-Onset Gender Disphoria in Adolescents and Young Adults: A Study of Parental
Reports, 18 PLOS ONE, Aug. 16, 2018, at 34-37 (arguing that even if the numbers
concerning desisters are inflated, however, the fact that data show some number genderquestioning children ultimately desist from that questioning and thus are not transgender
may influence some doctors to recommend against a birth certificate change for
transgender K-12 students).
58. See id.
59. See Singal, supra note 55.
60. See Guidelines, supra note 56, at 842.
61. See id.
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very slowly with social and medical transition.62
While the psychological community has yet to reach a consensus, there is
much broader consensus concerning transgender adolescents.63 This is
because “the persistence of gender dysphoria into adulthood appears to be
much higher for adolescents.”64 Psychologists largely agree that treatment
of gender dysphoria in teens may include medical intervention, specifically
hormones that suppress the onset of puberty (which is reversible and gives
adolescents time to work through their exploration of their gender identity)
and, as an adolescent’s transgender identity solidifies, hormone therapy
(which enables their body to develop secondary sex characteristics consistent
with their gender identity).65 The SOC direct that genital surgery should not
be performed until a person reaches the age of legal majority to consent to
medical procedures.66 Because the age for medical consent in the United
States is 18, nearly all K-12 students living in the 16 states that require GCS
before correcting the gender marker on a birth certificate are precluded from
obtaining a corrected birth certificate.
There is a robust medical and scientific consensus that transgender
children are clinically and statistically more prone to negative mental health
outcomes such as depression, suicidal ideation, suicide, and anxiety when
they do not receive appropriate care vis-a-vis supporting their transgender
identity.67 Often, this care includes social transition for these students.68
2.

Transgender K-12 Students Face Hostile School Environments

Schools have provided fertile ground for political, cultural, and normative
fights over both sexual orientation and gender identity.69 These fights began

62.
63.
64.
65.

See Singal, supra note 55.
See American Psychological Association, supra note 56, at 842.
See WPATH SOC, supra note 16, at 11.
See Guidelines, supra note 56, at 842. (2015). See also WPATH SOC, supra note
16, at 19-20.
66. See WPATH SOC, supra note 16, at 21. The standards of care direct that the
person seeking genital surgery should have lived consistent with their gender identity for
at least twelve months. Id.
67. See generally Katherine Szczerbinski, Education Connection: The Importance
of Allowing Students to Use Bathrooms and Locker Rooms Reflecting Their Gender
Identity, 36 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 153, 153 (2016).
68. See Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 302-03.
69. See generally Jason P. Murphy, Does It Get Better? The Ongoing Political War
Against Queer Youth, in U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE POLITICS OF QUEER ERASURE
88-100 (C.A. Lugg ed., 2016).
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as fights over LGBT-inclusive curricula and sex education,70 and today
include fights about restroom access for transgender students. As minors,
K-12 students lack any meaningful political voice or power,71 resulting in
little to no gains in tolerance or acceptance, let alone inclusive policies:
“Since the 1990s, the US public school system has been the only
governmental site that appears to be largely impervious to the legal and
political changes that have benefited adult queer Americans.”72 As a result,
LGBT youth are stripped “of voice, power, and agency while they attend
public schools.”73
As a result, transgender students often face hostility, harassment, bullying,
and even violence from peers, teachers and school administrators.74 One of
the ways a student is outed as transgender, before they even enter the
classroom, is by the presentation of a birth certificate, which is required to
register a child in public school.75 The harms to transgender students when
they are denied the opportunity to use gender-affirming facilities, including
restrooms is real and extreme: “This severely disrupts their social
development, instills extraordinary anxiety about how they are seen and
treated by peers, and makes it nearly impossible for the student to focus on
school.”76 The distress caused by being refused access to gender-affirming
facilities leads many transgender students to forgo participating in sports or
physical education.77 Others refuse to use any bathroom, which causes
“physical and emotional discomfort, pain, and potential health complications
[that] can hinder the student’s ability to participate in school.”78 Moreover,
denying access to gender-affirming facilities stigmatizes transgender
students by sending a message “to the student and the entire community that
he or she is not normal. This kind of obvious disparate treatment reinforces
any bias that peers may have about the student and empowers them to engage
70. See id. at 86 (“Since the 1990s, the vast majority of sexuality education was
‘abstinence until marriage’ education . . . . Beginning in the 1990s, various states and
public school districts passed ‘no promo homo’ laws . . . . As a result, in some locales,
any mention of queer identity and life was scrubbed from the curriculum.”).
71. See id. at 95 (“Educational policy is the last venue where one can vote one’s
homophobic preferences . . . . Lacking real political power and voice means that queer
kids become an easy target for political violence.”).
72. See id. at 94.
73. See generally id.
74. Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 303-04.
75. See id. at 305.
76. See id. 306-07.
77. See id. (internal footnotes omitted).
78. See id. (internal footnotes omitted).
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in bullying.”79
Data from the Gay, Lesbian, Straight Education Network (GLSEN)’s
2015 National School Climate Survey reveal that the experience of being a
transgender student in America’s schools is dismal:
- Over 43 percent of feel unsafe at school;
- Nearly 40 percent avoid using the restroom because of safety
concerns;
- Over 54 percent were verbally harassed at school based on their
gender expression;
- Over 20 percent were physically harassed based on their gender
expression; and
- 9.4 percent were assaulted at school based on how they
expressed their gender.80
National data further shows that many schools have explicit antitransgender policies:
- 60 percent of transgender students had been required to use the
bathroom or locker room of their legal sex;
- 50.9 percent of transgender students had been prevented from
using their preferred name or pronoun; and
- 28 percent of transgender students had been prevented from
wearing clothes because they were considered inappropriate based
on their legal sex.81
In addition, the National Transgender Survey found:
- 78 percent of transgender K-12 students reported harassment;
- 35 percent of transgender K-12 students reported physical
assault;
- 12 percent of transgender K-12 students reported sexual
violence; and
- 15 percent of transgender K-12 students reported harassment so
severe that it led them to leave school (K-12 settings or higher
education).82
Data shows that hostile school climates result in transgender youth having
lower academic aspirations, which leads to dropping out of school at higher
rates than cisgender students.83 In addition, transgender student enjoy less

79. See id.
80. See JOSEPH G. KOSCIW ET AL., GLSEN THE 2015 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE

SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER
YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS 12-13, 22-24 (2015).
81. See KOSCIW ET AL., supra note 80, at 38.
82. See GRANT ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
83. See KOSCIW ET AL., supra note 80, at 42.
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academic success than their cisgender peers.84 They are disciplined at higher
rates than cisgender students.85 Together, these negative educational
outcomes lead to overall lower income levels for transgender people.86
In addition to these practical harms, there is grave psychological harm:
Transgender students experience low self-esteem and depression at higher
levels than do cisgender students because of hostile schools, as well as a
higher rate of attempted suicide.87 Those who reported being mistreated in
school had higher rates of drug and alcohol abuse.88 Finally, hostile school
environments are responsible for negative physical health outcomes for
transgender students, including medical problems resulting from
dehydration (caused by restricting water intake to avoid restroom use) and
from abstaining from restroom use (such as kidney and urinary tract
infections).89
3. A Note on this Article’s Proposals Considering the Data on
Transgender Youth
This Article posits that invalidation of the surgical requirement will allow
K-12 students to obtain correct birth certificates, which in turn will facilitate
their use of gender-affirming sex-segregated facilities in ways that will
minimize larger-scale fights over schools’ discriminatory policies.
However, these proposals should not be read as appropriate for all K-12
students or as the normative goal for creating safe schools for transgender
students.
Ultimately, the treatment protocol for every transgender child and
adolescent should be tailored to that person and depend on the person’s
particular clinical situation and goals.90 Particularly given the data on
84. See id. at xviii.
85. See id.
86. See GRANT ET AL., supra note 6, at 33 (explaining “[t]hose who reported

mistreatment in school were 50% less likely to earn $50,000/year than the general
population,” and noting that respondents in one survey “who said they were physically
assaulted at school due to gender identity/expression were twice as likely to have done
sex work and other work in the underground economy and were 50% more likely to be
incarcerated”).
87. See KOSCIW ET AL., supra note 80, at xviii, 49-49; GRANT ET AL., supra note 6,
at 33.
88. See GRANT ET AL., supra note 6, at 33 (“For those who were physically assaulted
or had to leave school due to harassment, rates of misuse of alcohol and drugs doubled.”).
89. See GLSEN, SEPARATION AND STIGMA: TRANSGENDER YOUTH & SCHOOL
FACILITIES, 2 (2017) [hereinafter SEPERATAION AND STIGMA], https://www.glsen.org/
sites/default/files/Separation%20and%20Stigma%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf.
90. See WPATH SOC, supra note 16, at 3; see also Silver, supra note 6, at 500 (“The
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prepubescent youth who question their gender identity, not every parent of
an elementary-school-aged transgender child may desire to change their
child’s birth certificate to facilitate the use of gender-affirming restrooms for
their child. Rather, they may prefer to take a more incremental approach—
not seek a birth certificate correction—but instead work with school officials
to devise a transition plan for their child that includes the use of genderaffirming facilities. This Article does not take the position that corrected
birth certificates must be presented before schools permit transgender
students to use gender-affirming facilities, or even that corrected birth
certificates ought to be presented. Instead, this Article advocates for a
removal of the surgical requirements from birth certificate correction statutes
so parents of K-12 transgender student have the opportunity, option, and
choice to seek a corrected birth certificate to more easily navigate the school
system. This option would be particularly important in areas of the country
in which schools are more hostile toward transgender students—those in
small towns/rural areas,91 those in the South and Midwest,92 those without a
Gay-Straight Alliance (GSA),93 and religious schools.94 For parents of a
transgender child—one that has been clinically diagnosed with gender
dysphoria and whose medical providers agree is highly likely to persist into
adulthood as a transgender person via social, medical, and/or legal
transition—seeking a corrected birth certificate should be an option.
Transgender adolescents, who are statistically much more likely to persist in
their transgender identity for life, should also have the opportunity to seek a
corrected birth certificate with the support of their parents and medical
caregivers.
II. WHERE ARE WE NOW? THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR BIRTH
CERTIFICATE CORRECTION AND TRANSGENDER CLAIMS UNDER TITLE IX
A. The Importance of Identity Documents
Identity documents, including birth certificates, driver’s licenses,
passports, and social security cards are a foundational requirement to exist
in modern society.95 Inconsistency between lived gender and the sex
medical model also fails to recognize the need for individual choice in deciding what
procedures are necessary to express gender. Gender-confirming healthcare is a
personalized process that must be tailored to meet individual needs and desires.”).
91. See KOSCIW supra note 80, at xxxiv, 107-08.
92. See id., at 104-107, 127.
93. See id., at 54, 61-64,
94. See id., at xxiv, 97-103.
95. See generally Johnson, supra note 12, at 213-14 (“Identification documents are
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indicated on identity documents creates obstacles and hardships for
transgender people in both the social and economic realms,96 an issue that
has been powerfully and thoroughly canvassed by scholars, particularly
Professor Dean Spade.97 For the purposes of this Article, a general summary
will suffice.
Professor Spade identifies three realms in which transgender people are
particularly impacted by the government’s insistence on categorizing people
by gender: “(1) access to identity verifying documentation, (2) placement in
sex-segregated facilities, and (3) access to gender-confirming health care.”98
The state’s conclusion about a person’s gender in each of these realms will
“condition access to key resources and opportunities, and rules regarding
reclassification of gender have a significant impact on those who seek to gain
access in accordance with a gender classification different than the one they
were assigned at birth.”99 The obstacles erected by the state’s gender
classification policies produce “a general economic and social
marginalization of the transgender population.”100
There are many contexts, such as traveling, obtaining employment,
interacting with law enforcement, and purchasing alcohol, in which one is
required to show an identity document such as a driver’s license or birth
certificate.101 When there is a mismatch between the gender marker on the
identity document and the gender presentation of the holder of the document,
that person will be exposed to the possibility of harassment, ridicule,
discrimination, or even violence from the person who recognizes the
inconsistency.102
relied on today more than ever. These documents are needed to travel, start new jobs,
open bank accounts, apply to colleges, acquire funding for education or housing, rent a
car, or to purchase alcohol and even certain cold medicines.”).
96. See generally Spade, supra note 12, at 734.
97. See id.; see also, Ruocco, supra note 12, at 193-94.
98. See generally Spade, supra note 12, at 751.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See Ruocco, supra note 12, at 200 (“[L]egal gender is marked on documents that
are ubiquitous and necessary to engage in ordinary activities.”).
102. See Spade, supra note 12, at 737; see also Ruocco, supra note 12, at 197-99
(2016); Johnson, supra note 12, at 215 (“[G]ender incongruent identification exposes
people to a range of negative outcomes, from denial of employment, housing, and public
benefits to harassment and physical violence.”); Wenstrom, supra note 12, at 136 (noting
that the “inability to obtain legal recognition of their new gender has a devastating impact
on transgender people” and summarizing the various ways this is true); Mottet, supra
note 12, at 392 (“This is not an abstract issue; inspection of one’s birth certificate (or
documents it generates) can lead directly to discrimination and even violence, especially
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B. Birth Certificate Correction: The Current Legal Landscape
Each state promulgates its own rules and procedures governing birth
certificate content, issuance, and amendment/correction.103 Although the
states retain this power, the federal government is involved on several levels.
The federal government promulgates guidelines for the gathering of vital
statistics, and the states collect it pursuant to those guidelines.104 More
specifically, the federal government, through the Department of Health and
Human Services, promulgates the Model Vital Statistics Act (MSVSA),
which has been adopted by many states.105 First promulgated in 1907, it
addressed the issue of corrected birth certificates for transgender Americans
in its 1977 update by recommending that birth certificate correction for
transgender people be permitted upon a showing that the applicant
underwent surgery to change their sex and upon the presentation of a court
order noting that fact.106 Last revised in 1992, the current MSVSA continues
to include the surgical requirement.107 States with the surgical requirement
vary in whether they adopt the exact language of the MSVSA or write their
own language based on the MSVSA.108
Birth certificates are used to access key societal institutions and resources,
such as schools, insurance policies, and pension programs.109 Moreover, “a
birth certificate operates as one form of ‘breeder’ document, an ID from
which other identity documents are created.”110 All 50 states, plus the District
of Columbia and New York City, have an agency responsible for issuing
birth certificates.111
when the situation involves interactions with security officers, employment, or access to
sex-segregated facilities.”).
103. See Spade, supra note 12, at 764-65. (noting that the federal government has
provided a template for states to gather and track such information through the
promulgation of the Model Vital Statistics Act); see also id. at 767.
104. See id.
105. See Mottet, supra note 12, at 376-77; Rappole, supra note 12, at 192.
106. See Mottet, supra note 12, at 377, citing Model State Vital Statistics Act and
Regulations § 21(e) (Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention 1992), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/mvsact92b.pdf.
107. See id. at 401 (quoting CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MODEL
STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT AND REGULATIONS 10 (1992)) (“[T]he sex of an individual
born in this State has been changed by surgical procedure . . . .”).
108. See id. at 400-01 and app. A (summarizing the nature of surgical requirements
in all states and U.S. territories).
109. See Spade, supra note 12, at 766.
110. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 217.
111. See Spade, supra note 12, at 767 (noting that New York State has a process
separate and apart from the process of New York City; thus, a resident of New York City
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Currently, seventeen states require proof of GCS to correct a gender
marker on a birth certificate.112 Professor Anne Silver uses the term “medical
model” to describe the policies of these states because they “place legal
significance on the treatments and surgery that a person has completed” such
that “[l]egal rights are inextricably bound up with medical treatment . . . .”113
The American Medical Association has publicly criticized policies that
require surgery to correct a gender marker on identity documents and called
for such requirements to be abolished.114
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia will issue a corrected birth
certificate with no surgery requirement and no requirement of a court
order.115 In nine states, it is not clear whether surgery or a court order is
necessary to obtain a corrected birth certificate.116 In three states, the
requirements for correcting a birth certificate are not clear, not known, or
unwritten.117 Finally, three states prohibit the correction of gender markers
on birth certificates.118 Tennessee bars transgender people from correcting
their birth certificate.119 The Kansas Division of Vital Statistics takes the
position that it lacks the authority to correct birth certificates for gender
transition.120 In Ohio, although state law provides that birth certificates may
be amended with a court order, courts in that state refuse to issue such
orders.121
Correcting gender markers on identity documents is not a “one stop
shopping” endeavor, but rather often involves seeking such correction at
will have a different avenue for changing their birth certificate than will a resident of
New York State).
112. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 13.
113. See generally Silver, supra note 6, at 496.
114. See Conforming Birth Certificate Policies to Current Medical Standards for
Transgender Patients H-65.967, AM. MED. ASS’N (2014), http://bit.ly/2EhkCQy (last
visited July 23, 2018).
115. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 13. (Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, California, Nevada, Minnesota, Illinois, Vermont, New York, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland, Florida, Delaware, and the District of Columbia).
116. See id. (South Dakota, Wyoming, Utah, Indiana, Mississippi, West Vriginia,
Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire).
117. See id. (Texas, Oklahoma, and South Carolina).
118. See id. (Kansas, Ohio, and Tennessee.).
119. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-203(d) (2006); see also Spade, supra note 12, at
735.
120. See TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW: RULES FOR
CHANGING GENDER MARKERS ON BIRTH CERTIFICATES 2 (2017), [hereinafter STATE-BYSTATE] (noting that the Transgender Law Center has filed suit challenging this position).
121. See id. at 3.
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different administrative agencies, each of which may have different rules.122
For example, to correct the gender marker in one’s social security records,
the Social Security Administration requires medical certification of
“appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition” from a licensed
physician, a full-validated ten-year passport with the correct gender marker,
a birth certificate with the correct gender marker, or a court order directing
recognition of the correct sex.123 To correct the gender marker on one’s U.S.
passport, in addition to completing forms and providing photographs, one
must provide medical certification of “appropriate clinical treatment for
gender transition” from a licensed physician.124 The same requirements
adhere to correcting one’s sex on a birth certificate if one was born abroad.125
States vary on how one can change the gender marker on one’s driver’s
license, with some requiring GCS and others having no surgical
requirements. In some states, there is a surgical requirement to correct one’s
birth certificate but not to change one’s driver’s license.126 These differing
requirements, particularly within the same state, lead to confusion at best and
concrete adverse consequences at worst.127
Given this incoherent patchwork of rules, it is not surprising that the
National Transgender Discrimination Survey (NTDS) reveals that only 24
percent of transgender people seeking to correct their birth certificate were
able to do so.128 By comparison, nearly half had corrected their social
security card and nearly 60 percent had corrected their driver’s license.129
Eighteen percent of those who sought to correct their birth certificates were
rejected.130 Over half of the survey respondents (53 percent) had not even

122. See generally Spade, supra note 12, at 734-35; see also Ruocco, supra note 12,
at 200-03 (describing the spectrum of state and federal mechanisms to change a gender
marker on an identity document).
123. See TRANSGENDER LAW CTR. ID PLEASE! QUICK GUIDE FOR CHANGING FEDERAL
IDENTITY DOCUMENTS TO MATCH YOUR GENDER IDENTITY 2 (2019) [hereinafter ID
PLEASE!]; see also Program Operations Manual System (POMS), SOC. SEC.,
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0110212200 (last visited July 23, 2018).
124. See, ID PLEASE!, supra note 123, at 26.
125. See STATE-BY-STATE., supra note 120, at 5 (adding that birth certificates are
known as “consular report of birth abroad”).
126. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 13 (Arizona, Colorado,
Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
127. See generally Spade, supra note 12, at 737-38.
128. See generally GRANT ET AL., supra note 6, at 139.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 143.
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attempted to change their birth certificate.131 The NTDS also revealed:
- 40 percent of those who presented ID (when it was required in
the ordinary course of life) that did not match their gender
identity/expression reported being harassed;
- 3 percent reported being attacked or assaulted; and
- 15 percent reported being asked to leave the setting in which
they had presented incongruent identification.132
Birth certificates are particularly important for K-12 students, most of
whom do not have other forms of identification, such as a driver’s license.133
Moreover, the birth certificate is often the document required by schools to
register students and used by schools to enter biographical information about
the student, including the student’s name and sex, into the school system’s
information system.134 The name and sex on the student’s birth certificate,
which are in turn made “official” through the school’s information system,
follow a student throughout the student’s academic career—for example, on
attendance sheets and standardized testing booklets—and the sex is used to
sort students for physical education and other sex-segregated activities.135
Schools that resist permitting transgender students to use gender-affirming
facilities often cite a policy of segregating students based on the sex assigned
at birth—the sex stated on their birth certificate—as the means of deciding
how to categorize students.136
As noted above, it is a common misconception that all transgender people
desire to undergo, and in fact do undergo, GCS.137 In fact, many transgender
people do not desire such surgery, or forgo it for other reasons.138 To be
131.
132.
133.
134.

See id.
See id. at 139.
See generally Complaint, B.D., supra note 10, at 2.
See Asaf Orr et al., SCHOOLS IN TRANSITION: A GUIDE FOR SUPPORTING
TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN K-12 SCHOOLS 20 (2015) https://www.genderspectrum.org/
staging/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Schools-in-Transition-2015.pdfpdf; see also Tobin
& Levi, supra note 4, at 306 (“The challenges for Pat and his family began when Pat was
ready to matriculate at the local elementary school. Registration at the school required
Pat’s parents to provide his birth record, which would disclose his assigned birth sex and
make his transgender status public.”).
135. See generally ORR, supra note 34, at 20.
136. See generally Khan, supra note 12, at 485.
137. See Spade, supra note 12, at 754 (noting the phrase “genital surgery” refers to
the creation of a vagina (vaginoplasty) or the creation of a penis (phalloplasty)); see also
Mottet, supra note 12, at 407 (“Sex reassignment surgeries are significantly less common
than is popularly believed” and listing common reasons transgender people do not have
surgery).
138. See Spade, supra note 12, at 755; see also Silver, supra note 6, at 498-500.
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eligible for surgery, a transgender person must be diagnosed with gender
dysphoria; those transgender people who do not receive that diagnosis, or
who do not want to obtain such diagnosis, are ineligible for GCS.139 As such,
when a state has a surgical requirement, it “establishes medical authorities
as gatekeepers with the power to regulate gender identity . . . . While nontrans people are free to modify their bodies at will through cosmetic surgery,
trans people must first demonstrate that they fulfill a fixed set of criteria.”140
For K-12 students, the surgical requirement is a complete barrier because
medical transition, in particular GCS, is not proper protocol for minor
children; the younger the child, the less medical transition will be appropriate
and available.141
C. Accessing Gender-Segregated Facilities in K-12 Schools
1.

Sex-Segregated Facilities: A Note on Origins

Although an extended discussion of the origin and socio-cultural impact
of sex-segregated facilities is beyond the scope of this Article, a quick
summary is helpful as context for the discussion that follows.
Sex-segregated facilities first emerged in the nineteenth century as woman
began to enter the U.S. workforce.142 Sex-segregated restrooms, in
particular, do not have their origin in any anatomical or biological
differences between men and women, but rather emerged from legislators’
desire “to regulate public architectural spaces in order to preserve a Victorian
social view of women.”143 That Victorian view of women included the belief
that women have weaker bodies than men, that women’s privacy must be
ensured, and the widespread social morality that women and men occupied
“separate spheres.”144 The sex-segregation of restroom and other facilities
139. See Silver, supra note 6, at 499-500.
140. See id.
141. See ORR ET AL., supra note 134, at 22; Khan, supra note 12, at 491; Tobin &

Levi, supra note 4, at 322-23 (“Because of the medical requirements that still exist in
many jurisdictions, updated identification is even less available to transgender youth.”).
142. See Jack B. Harrison, “To Sit or Stand”: Transgender Persons, Gendered
Restrooms, and the Law, 40 U. HAW. L. REV. 49, 54 (2017).
143. See id. at 49.
144. See id. at 59-61; see also Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms:
Law, Architecture, and Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20-24, 27-28 (2007)
(summarizing the historical development of sex-segregated public spaces using critical
architectural theory, which explains that the ways in which society uses spaces directly
impacts the ways in which society understands gender; also noting that sex-segregated
spaces grew not out of anatomical differences but to preserve the notion of gendered
separate spheres).
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thus “concretized and codified the belief that women are somehow weak and
must be protected and that men are predatory by nature.”145 This gendered
and culturally-created basis for sex-segregated restrooms, rather than a
biologically- or empirically-based rationale, is important to keep in mind as
the discussion below turns to the topic of sex-segregated facilities in K-12
schools.
2.

The Importance of Restroom Access

Access to any public restroom, including restrooms in public schools, is
vitally important to everyone; without access to a restroom, one’s ability to
partake in the public policy and engage as a citizen of the community is
severely curtailed.146 Without the opportunity to relieve oneself, one’s time
in public spaces is limited. The possibility of being harassed or denied access
to a public restroom often leads transgender people to avoid of public spaces
to avoid possible humiliation.147 The negative consequences related to lack
of access to restrooms are exacerbated in the K-12 school context because
these students are required to attend public school, and they have little
autonomy within the school schedule to structure their own time. As
explained in Part I, transgender students denied access to a gender-affirming
restroom are more likely to develop physical and emotional health problems
when denied access to gender-affirming restrooms.148
D. The Current Legal Landscape for K-12 Transgender Students
Currently, four primary sources of legal protections exist for K-12
transgender students: (1) Title IX, (2) constitutional protections (state and
federal), (3) state antidiscrimination law, and (4) school district policies.
1.

Title IX

Title IX provides that “no person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”149 Pursuant to delegated authority,
the Department of Education has promulgated implementing regulations as

145. See Harrison, supra note 142, at 62.
146. See Dolgin, supra note 28, at 99 (“Access to school and public bathrooms can

significantly impact one’s everyday life—and one’s emotional responses.”).
147. See id. at 100.
148. See SEPARATION AND STIGMA, supra note 89, at 4; see also Harrison, supra note
142, at 51-53.
149. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1971).
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well as guidance and “dear colleague letters” to assist schools in complying
with the law.150 The regulations permit schools to keep separate, sexsegregated restroom and locker room facilities for boys and girls, as long as
they are comparable.151
Title IX provides a private right of action.152 For an individual student to
prevail in their Title IX claim, they must prove (1) they were excluded from
participating in an education program based on sex, (2) the education
institution they attended received federal financial assistance at the time of
the alleged wrongdoing, and (3) the wrongful discrimination caused harm to
the plaintiff.153
The meaning of the term “sex” as used in the statute is the central question
that must be answered to determine whether transgender students are
protected by Title IX. If “sex” is construed narrowly to mean only sex
assigned at birth, transgender students will not fall within the statute’s
protections. In contrast, if “sex” is construed to include gender identity,
independently or through the theory of sex-stereotyping, then the statute will
protect transgender students. The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet weighed
in on this question.
When construing Title IX, courts often look at the precedent construing
Title VII, the federal law that prohibits discrimination in employment.154
Like Title IX, Title VII prohibits discrimination based on “sex.”155 The
Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Title VII’s
prohibition on sex discrimination includes transgender employees, often
based on the logic of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, namely that a plaintiff
may state a claim for sex discrimination when they allege the discrimination
was because they failed to comply with or adhere to characteristics typically
associated with their gender.156 A number of federal district courts have
150.
151.
152.
153.

See generally Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 307.
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2019).
See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1998).
See Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir.

1994).
154. See Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 858 F.3d 1034, 1047 (7th Cir.
2017).
155. See, e.g., id. at 1046-47.
156. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (holding that Title
VII “intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes.”); Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 893 F.3d 179, 199
(3rd Cir. 2018), vacated by Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 515 (3rd Cir.
2018) (“Title IX prohibits discrimination against transgender students in school
facilities . . . . Therefore a court may not issue an injunction that would subject the
transgender students to different conditions than their cisgender peers are subjected to.”);
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reached the same conclusion.157
The Obama Administration’s Departments of Education and Justice issued
guidance and “dear colleague letters” making express that the term “sex” in
Title IX includes transgender students; thus schools are required to treat
transgender students in every way—including restroom access—in
accordance with their gender identity.158 The Trump Administration,
however, rescinded those guidance and dear colleague letters in February,
2017.159 As a result, case law that construed Title IX to protect transgender
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2018)
(confirming that claims of discrimination on the basis of transgender status is per se sex
discrimination under Title VII); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316-20 (11th Cir.
2011) (recognizing that a “person is defined as transgender precisely because of the
perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes,” and holding that
terminating an employee because she is transgender violates the prohibition on sex-based
discrimination under the Title VII); Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Comty. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed.
App’x. 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009) (“After Hopkins . . . it is unlawful to discriminate against
a transgender (or any other) person because he or she does not behave in accordance with
an employer’s expectations for men or women.”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566,
572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that discrimination against a transgender employee was a
violation of Title VII because such discrimination was “based on his failure to conform
to sex stereotypes by expressing less masculine, and more feminine mannerisms and
appearance.”).
157. See Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1014 (D. Nev. 2016);
Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 527 (D. Conn. 2016); Schroer v.
Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging &
Diagnostics Group, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659–661 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (“Title VII and
Price Waterhouse . . . do not make any distinction between a transgendered litigant who
fails to conform to traditional gender stereotypes and [a] ‘macho’ female who . . . is
perceived by others to be in nonconformity with traditional gender stereotypes.”);
Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, No. Civ.A. 05-2432006, WL 456173, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 21, 2006) (holding that a transgender plaintiff may state a claim for sex
discrimination by “showing that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes of how a man
should look and behave was the catalyst behind defendant’s actions”); Kastl v. Maricopa
Cty. Comm. College Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *2–3 (D.
Ariz. June 3, 2004), aff’d 325 Fed. Appx. 492 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[N]either a woman with
male genitalia nor a man with stereotypically female anatomy, such as breasts, may be
deprived of a benefit or privilege of employment by reason of that nonconforming
trait.”); Tronetti v. Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-cv-0375E(SC), 2003 WL
22757935, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (holding transsexual plaintiff may state a
claim under Title VII “based on the alleged discrimination for failing to ‘act like a
man’”).
158. See Heffernan, supra note 12, at 220 (summarizing the Obama-era guidelines
concerning Title IX’s coverage of transgender students).
159. See id. at 221 (“[I]n February of 2017, officials in the Trump Administration’s
Education Department unequivocally rejected the Obama-Era guidance documents and
clarifications.”).
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students by relying on the Obama-era guidelines are no longer controlling
authority. That is true of the most well-known transgender Title IX case,
G.G. v. Gloucester County School District (the “Grimm case”),160 in which
the Fourth Circuit deferred to the Obama-era guidelines161 to hold that Title
IX does include transgender students within its protections. As a result, it
held that the district court erred in denying a preliminary injunction directing
the defendant school district to allow Gavin Grimm, a high school
transgender boy, to use the boys’ restroom.162
Prior to the Trump Administration rescinding the Obama-era guidelines,
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Grimm case,163 and the
nation hoped for a definitive ruling on whether Title IX protects transgender
students. However, upon the rescission of the guidelines by the Trump
Administration, the Court reversed course: it vacated and remanded the case
to the Fourth Circuit “for further consideration in light of the guidance
document issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice
on February 22, 2017.”164
The few courts that have addressed the central question—whether “sex”
as used in Title IX includes transgender students—since the Court’s remand
have held that Title IX does, indeed, protect transgender students. In Doe v.
Boyertown Area School District,165 a group of cisgender students and their
parents sued their school district, alleging, among other claims, that their
Title IX rights were violated by the defendant school district’s policy
allowing transgender students to use gender-affirming restrooms and locker
rooms.166 The Third Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of the
plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, thus holding that the plaintiffs
were unlikely to prevail on the merits of their Title IX claim.167 The Third
Circuit held, in pertinent part: “Title IX prohibits discrimination against
transgender students in school facilities . . . . Therefore a court may not issue
an injunction that would subject the transgender students to different
conditions than their cisgender peers are subjected to.”168 In support of this

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 708, 709 (4th Cir. 2018).
See id. at 723.
See id. at 725-26.
See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (mem).
See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem).
See Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 893 F.3d 179, 199 (3rd Cir. 2018),
vacated by Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 515 (3rd Cir. 2018).
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 517.
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statement, the Boyertown court relied on two Title VII cases, from the Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits, holding that discriminating against transgender
employees constitutes sex discrimination,169 as well as the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1.170
In Whitaker, a transgender boy sued his school district under Title IX and
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause after it prohibited him
from using the boys’ bathrooms and locker room.171 The school district used
a student’s birth certificate to determine which sex-segregated facilities the
student would be permitted to use.172 After the school district lost at the trial
court, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that policy violated Title IX
because it discriminated against transgender people based on their failure to
conform to sex stereotypes.173 The court relied on the Supreme Court’s
broad interpretation of “sex” under Title VII.174 Two district courts have also
reached the same conclusion.175
169. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A] person is
defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior
transgresses gender stereotypes . . . . Accordingly, discrimination against a transgender
individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination”); see also Smith
v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that sex discrimination
under Title VII “encompasses both the biological differences between men and women,
and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a failure to conform to
stereotypical gender norms”).
170. See Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 858 F.3d 1034, 1034 (7th Cir.
2017).
171. See id. at 1042.
172. See id. at 1053.
173. See id. at 1048-49 (“By definition, a transgender individual does not conform to
the sex-based stereotypes of the sex that he or she was assigned at birth.”).
174. See id. at 1047-48 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989)) (holding that Title VII “intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”).
175. See A.H. v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 290 F. Supp. 3d 321, 323–25, 326–32
(M.D. Pa. 2017) (denying school district’s motion to dismiss a transgender student’s Title
IX and Equal Protection Claims based on school district’s bathroom policy “dictating
that children must use the bathroom corresponding to the sex listed on the student’s birth
certificate”); see also M.A.B. v. Board of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 715
(D. Md. 2018). But see Evancho v. Pine–Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288,
295 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (“[T]his Court simply cannot conclude that the path to relief sought
by the Plaintiffs under Title IX is at the moment sufficiently clear such that they have a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of that claim. Put plainly, the law
surrounding the Regulation and its interpretation and application to Title IX claims
relative to the use of common restrooms by transgender students, including the impact
of the 2017 Guidance, is at this moment so clouded with uncertainty that this Court is
not in a position to conclude which party in this case has the likelihood of success on the
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Finally, the court considering the Grimm case after its remand from the
U.S. Supreme Court recently held that discrimination based on transgender
status is sex-based discrimination under Price Waterhouse.176 It thus
concluded that “Mr. Grimm has properly brought a Title IX claim of
discrimination “on the basis of sex”—that is, based on his transgender
status.”177
Thus, the majority of courts to consider the question of Title IX’s
protection of transgender students since the Court’s remand of the Grimm
case have held that it does protect transgender students but have done so
largely by analogizing to the Title VII sex-stereotyping cases.
2.

Constitutional Equal Protection

The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of whether
transgender people constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class for purposes
of equal protection analysis. However, the lower courts that have addressed
equal protection claims asserted by transgender plaintiffs largely have found
that discrimination based on transgender status does violate the promises of
equal protection.178 These lower courts have split, however, on the level of
scrutiny applicable to transgender people as a class, with some courts
applying the rational basis standard and others applying the intermediate
standard of review.179
If discrimination against transgender students is considered discrimination
based on sex, then intermediate scrutiny applies, meaning that the state must
show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the discriminatory
action.180 To meet this standard, the government must show “at least that the
classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives.”181
Assuming sex discrimination includes discrimination against transgender
merits of that statutory claim.”).
176. See Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 745-46 (E.D. Va.
2018) (“[T]ransgender discrimination is per se actionable sex discrimination under Title
VII.”).
177. See id. at 747.
178. See generally Khan, et al., supra note 12, at 479.
179. See id; see also Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 872-74 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (holding transgender student’s
claim of access to gender-affirming restrooms should be analyzed under heightened
scrutiny).
180. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 526-28, 531, 554 (1996).
181. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
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students, the next step in the analysis is whether the state—in this context,
the school—can offer an exceedingly persuasive justification for
determining access to sex-segregated school facilities based on sex assigned
at birth.182
The two most commonly offered state justifications to deny transgender
people (including transgender students) access to a gender-affirming
restroom are (1) the privacy interests of the cisgender people/students, who
argue they are uncomfortable sharing a sex-segregated space with a
transgender person,183 and (2) permitting transgender people or students to
use a gender-affirming restroom presents a safety risk, at least in the context
of a transgender girl using the girls’ restroom. This argument reasons that
boys will pretend to be transgender girls to gain access to the girls’ restroom
and assault cisgender girls.184 However, there is no empirical data that
cisgender boys (or men) engage in this kind of deceit.185 In addition, there
are no reported assaults by transgender people against cisgender people in
public restrooms.186
The notion of personal privacy articulated by anti-transgender advocates
today traces its roots back to the Victorian era and its near-obsession with
modesty vis-a-vis the human body and its functions.187 The urbanization of
America, coupled with advances in technology, which together created more
populated areas with more crowded public spaces, caused anxiety and
retrenchment on issues of bodily privacy, such that the “right of individual
privacy . . . was elevated to sacred status, which everyone was bound to
respect.”188 Similarly, today, arguments about the privacy rights of cisgender
students to use school restrooms free of the presence of transgender students
are steeped in anxiety and retrenchment—anxiety created by the transgender
182. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.
183. See Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 317; see also Bd. of Educ. of the Highland

Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. at 874-75.
184. See Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 876; see
generally Samar, supra note 3, at 51-58 (summarizing the privacy and safety rationale
proffered by the state in support of legal-sex-based access to restrooms and locker
rooms).
185. See Szczerbinski, supra note 67, at 154.
186. See Pogofsky, supra note 12, at 754 (“Despite there being no reported incidents
of transgender violence against women or children in public restrooms, these arguments
persist.”); see also Levi & Redman, supra note 2, at 160 (“Even in San Francisco (the
U.S. city most likely to have the highest percentage of transgender women per capita),
there has never been a single police report of a transgender woman harassing another
woman in a bathroom.”) (internal citation omitted).
187. See generally Kogan, supra note 144, at 47.
188. See id.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019

31

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 5

60

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27

student’s disruption of the gender binary, a concept that for most people is
inevitable, stable, “natural,” and occupies a “sacred status.”189 Just as
policymakers in the Victorian era “sought to reconcile the early [nineteenth]
century vision of women with the realities of late century life[,]”190 so too
are today’s policymakers seeking to reconcile the mid- to late-twentieth
century notions of gender as unwaveringly binary with the realities of
twenty-first century life, in which notions of the gender binary are
continually challenged in the courts, in the classroom, on social media, and
in popular culture.
Notwithstanding its deep historical roots, courts should reject this privacy
argument, either because it is not legitimate, exceedingly persuasivem, or
compelling, or because policies hinging access to sex-segregated facilities
are not rationally related or substantially related or narrowly tailored to the
interest. To begin, there is no legally protected right to privacy grounded in
a cisgender student’s discomfort in sharing a sex-segregated space with a
transgender peer.191 In fact, in the employment context, the Eighth Circuit
has held that permitting a transgender woman to use the women’s restroom
did not create a hostile work environment for an objecting cisgender
woman.192 By analogy, then, cisgender students’ discomfort about sharing
sex-segregated spaces with a transgender student is not a legitimate reason
to exclude transgender students from these spaces. In fact, Title IX’s
enactment was to address this exact scenario, namely to guarantee that the
educational opportunities of a student
[A]re not subordinated to another person’s negative feelings about
a group of people, however genuine those feelings may be. These
feelings may be sincere, deeply felt, and not consciously malicious,
but they are nevertheless a manifestation of bias, not a cognizable
right or a justification for discriminatory conduct.193
The hollowness of the privacy and safety arguments are illustrated by the
fact that schools do not ask all students using sex-segregated facilities to
prove that they have the anatomy that corresponds with the facility’s
189. See id.
190. See id. at 55.
191. See Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 316 (“No court has ever held that there is any

legal right to privacy that would be violated simply by permitting a transgender person
to access a gender-specific facility that corresponds to his or her gender identity.”).
192. See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., #1, 294 F.3d 981, 983-84 (8th Cir. 2002); see
also Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 317-18 (noting that in the employment context,
termination of an employee because of customer preference—a customers’ discomfort
with an employee—is not a proper justification to terminate the employee).
193. See Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 318.
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designation; rather, schools only ask for such proof from students who are
transgender or suspected of being transgender.194 These rationale, then,
clearly are pretext for the real reason behind the policy: transphobia.195
Finally, the safety argument is overinclusive and thus not a legitimate
interest on which to base a policy denying transgender students access to
gender-affirming restrooms. Such policies are overbroad because “[i]t is a
fallacy to include among the maliciously-disguised those people for whom
their gender expression is not a disguise at all, but how they live their daily
life and understand their deepest sense of self.”196
It is no more a disguise for a transgender person to dress in accordance
with his or her gender identity than it is for a near-sighted person to wear
glasses or a person with big feet to wear large shoes. Even granting, for
argument’s sake, that transgender people are in “disguise,” which itself
betrays a deep ignorance of transgender people’s lives and experiences, the
laws are still impermissibly overinclusive because there is no significant risk
of crime.197
Moreover, most courts that have considered the privacy and safety
rationales have rejected them. In Board of Education of the Highland Local
School District v. U. S. Department of Education,198 the court soundly
rejected both arguments in a case concerning a transgender student’s access
to the girls’ restroom. It found no evidence that the transgender girl herself
would infringe upon the privacy rights of any other students; thus, it
reasoned, the school failed to provide the required exceedingly persuasive
justification, “or even a rational one,” for preventing her from using the girls’
restroom.199 The court also rejected the defendant’s “safety and lewdness”
justifications, citing an amicus brief submitted by school administrators
stating that “no incidents of individuals using an inclusive policy to gain
access to sex-segregated facilities for an improper purpose have ever
194. See id. at 322.
195. See id. (“This makes it clear that the real issue is bias against transgender

students.”); see also id. at 325 (“[T]he very purpose of non-discrimination laws, such as
Title IX, is to press against and shift norms and stereotypes, often outdated, which have
the effect of interfering with a marginalized group’s ability to function or participate in
society, and in the case of Title IX, for students reliant on public education Adopting and
institutionalizing social discomfort with a specific group has the opposite effect of
reifying the underlying social norms that give rise to the discriminatory attitudes in the
first place.”).
196. See Levi & Redman, supra note 2, at 160 (internal citations omitted).
197. See id. at 160 (internal citations omitted).
198. See 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
199. See id. at 877.
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occurred.”200 Other courts agree that these purported state interests cannot
carry the day.201
The most recent, post-remand decision in the Grimm case likewise held
that a transgender student has an Equal Protection claim for being denied
access to gender-affirming restrooms, and that such claims are properly
considered using the intermediate scrutiny standard.202 The court further
held that the state’s alleged interest—protecting the privacy rights of
cisgender students—was not substantially related to the policy of excluding
Grimm from gender-affirming restrooms “because there are many other
ways to protect privacy interests in a non-discriminatory and more effective
manner than barring Mr. Grimm from using the boys’ restrooms.”203 Other
federal district courts have reached the same conclusion.204
Thus, in the most recent Equal Protection cases involving transgender
students and exclusionary restroom policies, courts have soundly rejected the
asserted state interests of privacy and safety.
3.

State Antidiscrimination Law

The District of Columbia, along with thirteen states, have state laws that
expressly protect transgender students.205 In four states—Delaware,
Maryland, Michigan, and Rhode Island—state agencies have issued policies
that expressly require inclusion of transgender students in school facilities.206
200. See id. at 876.
201. See A.H. v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 290 F. Supp. 3d 321, 331 (M.D. Pa

2017); M.A.B. v. Talbot Cty. Bd. Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 723-24 (D. Md. 2018); see
also Evanhco v. Pine-Richard Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288-89, 237 F. Supp. 3d
267, 288-89 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
202. See Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 748-51 (E.D. Va.
2018).
203. See id. at 752 (“For example, the Board had taken steps ‘to give all students the
option for even greater privacy’ by installing partitions between urinals and privacy strips
for stall doors . . . . Additionally, students who wanted greater privacy for any reason
could have used one of the new single-stall restrooms made available upon
implementation of the policy.”).
204. See A.H., 290 F. Supp. 3d at 331; see also M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 723; see
also Students and Parents for Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-4945, 2017 WL
6629520, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2017) (rejecting cisgender students’ claim to privacy
because it “flies in the face of Whitaker . . . . Whitaker is binding on this Court, and the
stay in G.G. [Grimm] preserved the status quo. It does not create a privacy right of the
nature that Plaintiffs assert.”).
205. See SEPARATION AND STIGMA, supra note 89, at 5 (California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington).
206. See id.
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Moreover, some localities—cities and towns—have municipal
antidiscrimination provisions that protect transgender people from
discrimination.207 These statutes have been interpreted in several contexts,
including the school context, to mandate the use of gender-affirming
restrooms and other sex-segregated facilities.208 To exclude transgender
students from gender-affirming restrooms would constitute unlawful
discrimination based on the student’s protected transgender identity.209
These statutes, where available, offer another avenue for transgender
students to gain access to gender-affirming sex-segregated facilities.
4.

School District Policies

As of early 2018, more than 300 school districts have enacted district-wide
policies that permit transgender students to use gender-affirming facilities.210
Where available, such policies mean that a transgender student will have no
need to assert legal claims to gain access to gender-affirming facilities.
III. THE SURGICAL REQUIREMENT IS COUNTERFACTUAL,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, UNLAWFUL, AND UNETHICAL
Building on pending litigation,211 case law, and scholarship, this part
provides a comprehensive overview of the legal, medical, and ethical bases
for challenging the surgical requirement and provides a road map for
litigators and courts to present and analyze such challenges. The surgical
requirement should be invalided because (1) it is factually incorrect based on
current medical and scientific understandings of sex and gender, (2) it is
unconstitutional under the First, Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, (3) it
207. See Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 311-12.
208. See id.; see, e.g., Doe v. Regional Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600, 607 (Me. 2014).

But see R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., WD 80005, 2017 WL 3026757, at *79 (Mo. Ct. App. July 18, 2017). In R.M.A., a transgender boy denied access to the
school’s male restrooms and locker rooms failed to state a claim under the sex
discrimination provision of Missouri’s Human Rights Act. However, in January 23,
2018, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered the case transferred to it, meaning that the
issue is still open in Missouri. See Minutes of January 23, 2018, SUPREME COURT OF MO.
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/cfc8c4b5bc15cb1586
25661d0073593c/cd4fbcb140b6259f8625821a00774c5e?OpenDocument.
209. See Tobin & Levi, supra note 4, at 311-12.
210. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TRANSGENDER STUDENTS AND TITLE
IX (2018), https://www.lgbtmap.org/file/Title-IX-Two-Pager.pdf (last visited July 23,
2018).
211. See, e.g., Complaint, B.D, supra note 10, at 6; Complaint, Ray, supra note 10, at
6; Complaint, Corbitt, supra note 10 at 11; Petition for Judicial Review, supra note 10,
at 13.
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undermines the requirement of informed consent and principles of bioethics,
(4) it contravenes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and (5) it violates
state antidiscrimination law.
A. Modern Science Demonstrates that the Surgical Requirement is
Counterfactual
Recent science makes clear that sex and gender are far more complex than
mere reference to external genitalia at birth can convey. As noted in Part I,
“there is a growing body of research supporting the position that there is an
empirically measurable, anatomical explanation for transgenderism that lies
in the brain.”212 Thus, sex is the result of a variety of visible and invisible
factors, the most important of which is gender identity. As a result, “birth
certificates, which are based on cursory visual assessment at birth, are not a
reliable standard” by which to determine legal sex.213 Therefore, requiring
GCS under the reasoning that if a transgender person does not have GCS,
they are unable to become their “new” sex is counterfactual. The fact that
surgical requirements “make self-realization and access to official
documents . . . conditioned on conforming to a reductive definition of sex
which ignores its complexity as a biological and social phenomenon,”214 has
led the WPATH to denounce surgical requirements,215 as has the American
Psychological Association (APA), and the National Association of Social
Workers (NASW).216
Finally, state antidiscrimination law—when it includes transgender people
as a protected class—does not require that the transgender person have any
surgery before claiming the protections of the antidiscrimination law.217 The
absence of a surgical requirement in state antidiscrimination laws highlights
that the requirement in birth certificate correction laws is myopic, outdated,
and non-evidence-based.218
B. Addressing the Four State Interests
Before offering the affirmative constitutional claims that may be made to
challenge the surgical requirement, this subpart addresses the commonlyasserted state interests for enacting the surgical requirements. Because the
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See Vanderhorst, supra note 35, at 259.
See id. at 267.
See id. at 268.
See Mottet, supra note 12, at 406.
See id.
See id. at 411.
See id.
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states purported interests are balanced in constitutional claims, addressing
them at the outset will streamline the discussion of the affirmative
constitutional claims outlined below.
States have not often had the opportunity to provide their rationale for
enacting the surgical requirement.219 When they have, the most common
state interests offered to support the surgical requirement are (1) the
purported need to prevent fraud, (2) to ensure that the change is permanent,
(3) to ensure the safety of cisgender women in sex-segregated facilities, and
(4) the ensure the privacy of cisgender people in sex-segregated facilities.220
None of these provide even a rational basis for the surgical requirement, let
alone important or compelling state interests.
Regarding fraud, the state’s argument usually has two parts. First,
allowing the correction of a birth certificate without surgery could result in
same-sex marriages, long-banned in many states;221 this argument is no
longer valid in the wake of marriage equality through Obergefell v. Hodges.
Second, allowing the correction of a birth certificate without surgery could
result in people “disguis[ing] their gender to be better able to commit crimes
or terrorist acts.”222 This argument belies the reality that “the last thing a
person who is trying to blend in and escape notice should do is dress in the
opposite gender” as well as the fact that the federal government allows states
to set their own policies to determine gender for identity documents under
the Real ID Act.223 Moreover, the U.S. government allows transgender
people to change the gender marker on their passports and social security
records without surgery.224 The existence of these multiple gender marker
change policies, none of which require surgery, indicates that the fraud and
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See id. at 413.
See Mottet, supra note 12, at 413-18.
See id. at 414.
See id.
See id. at 414-15; see also Real ID, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/real-id (last visted July 22, 2018) (establishing “minimum security
standards for license issuance and production and prohibit[ing] Federal agencies from
accepting for certain purposes driver’s licenses and identification cards from states not
meeting the Act’s minimum standards”); see also H.B. 1268, 109th Cong. § 202(b)(3)
(2005) (enacted) (stating gender is a required field on a driver’s license under the act);
Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5,271 (Jan. 29, 2008) (to be
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 37) (requiring the regulations leave it to states to decide how
gender will be determine.).
224. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, UNDERSTANDING THE PASSPORT
GENDER CHANGE POLICY 2 (2014), [hereinafter PASSPORT] https://transequality.org/
sites/default/files/docs/kyr/passports_2014.pdf.
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security interests proffered by states in support of the surgical requirement
are not related to the requirement of surgery.225
Regarding the “permanence” interests, states argue that the surgical
requirement is necessary to ensure that a transgender person will not change
their mind about their gender identity and want to go back to their original
sex or gender. Surgery, it is argued, prevents this possibility of such flipflopping on gender identity.226 This argument is incorrect as a matter of fact:
available evidence demonstrates that it is exceptionally uncommon for a
transgender person to desire to switch back, and on the rare occasions that
happens it is often due to the discrimination experienced by the transgender
person that came about because they transition in the first space.227
Moreover, the concern for permanence should not be the record-keepers’
primary concern; rather, the primary concern should be accuracy.228 Thus
there is no “fit” between the surgery requirement and the asserted state
interest in permanence, as is required under the rational basis test and, as a
result, there can be no substantial relationship or narrow tailoring as is
required by the intermediate and strict scrutiny regimes.
Regarding the alleged interests in the safety of cisgender women in sexsegregated spaces and privacy for cisgender people in sex-segregated spaces,
these state interests fail the rational basis test, and thus every level of
scrutiny, when it comes to gender-affirming restroom access, as described in
Part II. They also fail as state interests to support the surgical requirement.
States with antidiscrimination laws that protect transgender people permit,
pursuant to those laws, transgender people to use gender-affirming restrooms
without any surgical requirement, and they do so in the face of the same
privacy and safety concerns that are offered to support the surgery
requirement to correct birth certificates.229 Given the data on attacks in
restrooms—that they rarely occur and, when they do, it is not transgender
people who are doing the attacking—and the fact that transgender people use
gender-affirming restrooms, regardless of their surgical status, pursuant to
trans-inclusive state antidiscrimination laws, there simply is no rational basis
for the surgical requirement for correcting birth certificates, let alone an
225.
226.
227.
228.

See Mottet, supra note 12, at 415.
See id. at 416.
See id.
See id. at 416 (“A record should be updated to maintain accuracy as often as there
is a change to relevant data. For example, if a person changes his or her name four times
over their life due for various reasons, and seeks to amend their birth certificate each
time, updating the birth certificate several times maintains an accurate record for them
throughout his or her entire life.”).
229. See id. at 420.
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important or compelling state interest. And, even if the state were found to
have a legitimate interest in safety, the “fit” between the state interest and
the surgical requirement is not related in any way that serves the state
interest. In fact, there are already laws that are directly related to the state
interest in the safety of all women in restrooms—criminal laws prohibiting
assault, battery and other crimes of violence.
In particular reference to privacy, Lisa Mottet explains, “on a daily basis
and in almost all social situations, a person’s genitals remain entirely private,
even inside sex-segregated facilities or in work situations where a person is
performing gender-specific duties.”230 She goes on to note that it is
increasingly rare for people to be in situations in which they will be fully
exposed to other people, such as open shower facilities in a prison or
homeless shelter.231 However, in the rare circumstances where that may be
a possibility, transgender people most often will reveal their anatomical
reality to the relevant authority.232 Moreover, “transgender people who have
not had genital surgery are very likely to go to great lengths to avoid having
other people observe their unclothed bodies. If they are able to do so, their
bodily characteristics should not be considered relevant.”233 There are many
ways in which to protect everyone’s privacy, such as curtains in changing
areas and stalls with closing doors in restrooms, that fit much more closely
with the state’s asserted privacy interest than excluding transgender people
who have not had GCS. Like the other asserted state interests, then, the
privacy argument is not a rational one, nor is the surgical requirement related
to the interest in a way that would support a rational basis—or any other level
of—review.
An amicus brief234 supported by school administrators from thirty-one
school districts and the District of Columbia filed in the U.S. Supreme Court
in the G.G. case addressed these arguments head-on and noted that not one
of the 31 school districts has ever had a problem with the privacy or safety
of cisgender students:
[They] have addressed and in some cases personally grappled with
many of the same fears and concerns in their own schools and
districts. However, in [their] professional experience, none of those
fears and concerns has materialized in the form of actual problems
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See id. at 417-18.
See id. at 418.
See id.
See id.
See Brief of the Amici Curiae School Administrators from Thirty-One States and
the District of Columbia in Support of Respondent, Cloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. 137
S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (No. 16-273).
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in their schools. Instead, inclusive policies not only fully support
the reality of transgender students’ circumstances, but also foster a
safer and more welcoming learning environment for all students.235
Thus, the privacy and safety arguments asserted by states, assuming they
are “legitimate” under the rational basis test, should be declared not to be
rationally related to the policy requiring surgery. If intermediate scrutiny is
applied, these interests, even if held to be “important,” should be declared
not to be substantially related to the policy requiring surgery. If strict
scrutiny is applied, even if held to be a “compelling” state interest, the policy
should be found not to be narrowly tailored.
C. The Surgical Requirement Violates the First Amendment
1. The Surgical Requirement Violates the Right to Refrain from Speaking
and the Right to Be Free from Endorsing a Government Message
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”236 This clause protects both the right
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking.237 As a result, a law that
compels speech with which an individual disagrees violate the First
Amendment.238
As explained above, many transgender people do not desire, cannot afford,
or are clinically or medically ineligible for GCS. For these individuals, the
surgical requirement is a complete bar to correcting their birth certificates.
Transgender people who cannot satisfy the surgical requirement but do
obtain a gender marker change on other identity documents (such as a
passport or driver’s license) will have mismatched identity documents.
Moreover, each time the person presents their birth certificate, the mismatch
will become apparent. This mismatch, created by the state’s surgical
requirement, thus compels speech by transgender people by compelling them
to communicate their transgender status to strangers.
This speech will always be compelled in the case of K-12 transgender
students, who are required to provide a birth certificate to register for public
school and who are not eligible for GCS. These students, who retain their
235. See id. at 2.
236. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
237. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of

thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”).
238. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61
(2006) (“[F]reedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they
must say.”).
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First Amendment speech rights in school,239 are forced to communicate that
they are transgender from the first moment they interact with a school. Many
transgender people, including transgender students, desire to keep the fact
that they are transgender private. In fact, courts have held that one’s
transgender status is a type of private information that is constitutionally
protected under the Due Process Clause.240 Thus, forcing such disclosure,
which is caused directly by the surgical requirement, violates the First
Amendment right to refrain from speaking.
In addition, the First Amendment provides that individuals have a right
not to speak a government message.241 To find otherwise would force
individuals to endorse a government message with which they disagree.242
The surgical requirement is not a neutral one; by requiring GCS, the
government is taking a position and making a statement on what constitutes
a “real” man and a “real” woman and thus taking a position on what sex and
gender mean. Many people, cisgender and transgender alike, disagree with
this position and desire not to express the government’s message about what
defines sex and gender. Thus, the mere presence of the surgical requirement
means that transgender people “are compelled to affirm a message that is
inherently opposed to their identity, and their ability to communicate their
disagreement with that compelled affirmation is vitiated by legal gender.”243
The surgical requirement thus unconstitutionally forces transgender people
to “endorse the government’s position as to their own gender, as well on the
meaning of gender generally, through the birth certificate they must show to
others.”244
Because freedom of speech rights are fundamental, states must show that
the surgical policies serve a compelling government interest and are
narrowly tailored to meet that interest. For the reasons stated above, this
239. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
240. See infra Part III.
241. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding

students cannot be compelled to recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
242. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (holding that New Hampshire could not force its
residents to accept the state motto on vehicle license plates; reasoning the government
cannot require expression of “an ideological message by displaying it on [an
individual’s] private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed
and read by the public”).
243. See Ruocco, supra 12, at 215; id. at 218 (arguing that the myriad of inconsistent
gender marker change policies “constitutes an unconstitutional condition” because they
compel transgender people “to choose between their bodily autonomy (i.e., avoiding
unwanted surgeries or medical interventions) and their right to identity (i.e., self-defining
their legal gender).”).
244. See Complaint, Ray, supra note 10, at 26.
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standard cannot be met.
2.

The Surgical Requirement Violates the Right to Expressive Conduct

Characterizing the choice about whether to have GCS as expressive
conduct under the First Amendment is another avenue for challenging the
surgical requirement. Scholars have argued for this expressive conduct
theory to challenge the exclusion of transgender adults and students from
gender-affirming public restrooms.245 The argument proceeds in three parts.
First, gender expression communicates a message about a person’s
identity.246 This is because transgender identity “communicates core
elements of one’s identity and is related to the free speech values of
autonomy and self-realization.”247 Second, a transgender person’s desire to
use a gender-affirming restroom communicates a meaningful message to
others about that person’s identity (as would the act of using a genderaffirming restroom).248 Third, and finally, this expressive conduct “falls
within the protective umbrella of the First Amendment” such that “school
officials must not improperly silence a transgender student’s expressive
conduct simply because the message conveyed (i.e., “I identify as a girl, even
though I was born with male genitalia”) makes them uncomfortable.”249
This argument is grounded in U.S. Supreme Court precedent concerning
expressive conduct and First Amendment rights, including those rights visa-vis students.250 Also known as symbolic speech, expressive conduct has
been held to be protected speech under the First Amendment.251 Examples
of protected expressive conduct include burning the American flag at a

245. See Weatherby, supra note 4, at 119-28; see also Jeffrey Kosbie, (No) State
Interest in Regulating Gender: How Suppression of Gender Nonconformity Violates
Freedom of Speech, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187, 242-45 (2013).
246. See Weatherby, supra note 4, at 93; see also Kosbie, supra note 245, at 204
(“Gender nonconformity should be protected as speech because speakers and listeners
understand the conduct as communicative.”).
247. See Kosbie, supra note 245, at 195, 204 (“Gender nonconformity should be
protected as speech because speakers and listeners understand the conduct as
communicative.”).
248. See Weatherby, supra note 4, at 93; see also Kosbie, supra note 245 , at 243
(citing “Restroom choice is deliberate and intended to communicate a central aspect of
identity: ‘I am a woman’, or ‘I am a man.’ . . . When a transgender man begins using the
men’s restroom, not only does his conduct communicate his gender, but he consciously
chooses to do so in order to communicate his gender identity.”).
249. See Weatherby, supra note 4, at 93.
250. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
251. See generally Kosbie, supra note 245, at 195.
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protest,252 engaging in a protest at a military funeral,253 nude dancing,254 and
wearing a jacket with the phrase “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse.255
Upon finding that a transgender student’s desire to use a gender-affirming
restroom is protected expressive conduct—because (1) it constitutes
symbolic speech,256 and (2) those perceiving it understood it as such257––a
school’s policy will then be subject to judicial scrutiny. The Court has held
that when a school’s conduct is aimed at suppressing the content of the
speech, “this will be an almost impossible hurdle for the school to overcome
since the most exacting scrutiny will be applied.”258
In the school context, students’ expressive conduct is protected unless it
impedes “the need to foster an educational atmosphere free from undue
disruptions to appropriate discipline”259 or the expressive conduct reasonably
could lead to a “substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities.”260 These standards are highly unlikely to be met, as the asserted
government interests in suppressing the speech—the privacy and safety of
cisgender students—have been soundly rejected by data.261
Similar arguments compel a finding that the surgical requirement violated
the right to expressive speech.262 Both the conduct of having surgery, as well
as the conduct of not having surgery, have expressive qualities.263 A
transgender person’s decisions about how their body looks is intrinsically
tied to the message they want to express about their gender.264 Put another
way, one’s conduct concerning one’s body embodies that person’s message
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989).
See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011).
See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000)
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17-18 (1971).
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); see also Johnson, 491
U.S. at 404.
257. See Bivens ex rel. Green v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 899 F. Supp. 556, 560-61
(D.N.M. 1995) (holding student failed to demonstrate his wearing saggy pants to express
his African-American identity was understood by others); accord Johnson, 491 U.S. at
404.
258. See Weatherby, supra note 4, at 123 (internal citations ommitted).
259. See Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 559 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
260. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
261. See Weatherby, supra note 4, at 124 (describing the lack of disruption when
transgender students are permitted to access gender-affirming restrooms).
262. See id. at 123.
263. See id. at 119.
264. See id. at 121.
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to the rest of the world about one’s gender expression and thus their lived
gender.265 The transgender person intends to send a message about their
gender through their body and dress, and those interacting with them
understand that the transgender person’s body is intended to relay a message
to others about that person’s gender identity.266 Requiring surgery to correct
one’s birth certificate infringes on this right to expressive conduct—the right
to express one’s identity through one’s body, whether surgically altered or
not.267
D. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”268 The Fifth
Amendment states that “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”269 The federal government,
through the Fifth Amendment, is also bound by the promise of Equal
Protection.270
These amendments have been held to prohibit sex
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination by the government.
The surgical requirement implicates the substantive Due Process rights to
liberty, dignity, and bodily autonomy, as well as the substantive Due Process
right to privacy. It also implicates the promise of Equal Protection, based
both on theories of sex discrimination and transgender discrimination.271
Each is discussed in turn.
1. The Surgical Requirement Violates the Substantive Due Process Rights
to Liberty, Dignity, Bodily Autonomy, Gender Autonomy, and Privacy
a.

Liberty and Dignity

Personal dignity and autonomy are rights of constitutional magnitude that
the U.S. Supreme Court has held are grounded in the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.272 In two cases addressing
LGBT rights, the Court has expounded on this notion. In Lawrence v.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See id.
See id.
See generally Mottet, supra note 12, at 424.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment includes an Equal Protection component applicable at the federal level).
271. See Mottet, supra note 12, at 422.
272. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Texas,273 the Court held that statutory prohibitions on consensual, same-sex
sodomy violated substantive Due Process.274 In so holding, the Court held
that individuals engaged in same-sex intimate conduct “are entitled to respect
for their private lives”275 and ruled that the government “cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government.”276 In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court held that the protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment “extend to certain personal choices central to
individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define
personal identity and beliefs.”277
Moreover, in the line of cases addressing marriage, family and
reproductive rights, the Court has reinforced that individuals enjoy a
constitutional interest in liberty and dignity in these kinds of personal
matters.278 The Court has held that “[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.”279
The Court continued: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”280
These cases demonstrate that when considering the promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment, specifically substantive due process rights, the
“Court has focused on the affirmative or productive consequences of the law
in question[,]”281 such that the Court will reject laws “that allow the State to
submerge the individual, appropriate the individual’s means of identitymaking, and affirmatively shape the individual’s life.”282
This line of cases thus stands for the principle that gay men, lesbians, and
bisexual people have constitutional right to not only define their own
identities vis-a-vis sexual orientation, but to live out those identities without

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See id. at 574.
See id., at 578.
See id.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015), (citing Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
278. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
279. See id.
280. See id. at 851.
281. See generally Ruocco, supra note 12, at 208.
282. See id.
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interference from the state when it comes to the daily embodiment of
personal dignity, autonomy, and relationships with others that are grounded
in their gay, lesbian, or bisexual identity.283 It is a short line indeed to
connect the Court’s holdings regarding identity, dignity, and personal
autonomy for LGB people to the identity, dignity, and personal autonomy
for transgender people.284 The formation and expression of one’s gender
identity forms the core of one’s overall identity; thus, the representation of
one’s gender identity as one’s legal sex is inherently and inextricably part
and parcel of the right of individual autonomy to self-identify, just as the
representation of one’s sexual orientation is inherently and inextricably part
and parcel of the right of individual autonomy to self-identify.285 As one
scholar notes, “gender, even more so than marital status, is a central point
around which identity and interpersonal interactions are ordered.
Compulsory gender identity thus ‘do[es] not simply proscribe one act or
remove one liberty; [it] inform[s] the totality of a person’s life.’”286 Another
scholar has called for the recognition of a fundamental right to gender
autonomy, which is recognized under international law and which is a logical
extension of Lawrence, Obergefell, and the line of reproductive rights
cases.287
The surgical requirement results in concrete and dignitary harms to
transgender people as a result of the mismatch between their gender
expression and their birth certificate.288 As a result, surgical requirements
“affirmatively shape the opportunities and security” of transgender
Americans in a limiting fashion that is constitutionally improper.289 States
that restrict gender marker correction through the surgical requirement thus
affirmatively—and unconstitutionally—deny transgender people the right to
self-definition and autonomy as embodied in the substantive due process
rights to identity, liberty, and autonomy.290 As described above, none of the
alleged state interests are compelling or narrowly tailored to the surgical
requirement.

283.
284.
285.
286.

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
See id. at 204-06.
See id. at 214.
See id. at 214 (quoting Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.
737, 747 (1989)).
287. See generally Mottet, supra note 12, at 424 (citing Goodwin v. United Kingdom,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2002)).
288. See generally Ruocco, supra note 12, at 216.
289. See id. at 214.
290. See id.
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Bodily Autonomy

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued several opinions that, taken together,
stand for the proposition that there is a fundamental right to bodily
autonomy, which is violated by the surgical requirement.291 The Court has
held that the right to refuse medical treatment is encompassed in substantive
Due Process rights.292 The line of cases addressing procreation and
reproductive rights hold that one has a fundamental right to choose or reject
parenthood and to control one’s reproductive choices.293 Finally, there is a
substantive Due Process right to be free from sterilization.294
The surgical requirement implicates each of these rights. The coercive
nature of the surgical requirement unduly burdens the right to be free from
unwanted medical procedures each time a transgender person undergoes
GCS, against their choosing, so that they can obtain a corrected birth
certificate. Moreover, GCS results in sterilization, while “other effects on
one’s reproductive capacity are inherent in many sex reassignment
surgeries.”295
As described above, none of the alleged state interests are compelling or
narrowly tailored to the surgical requirement.
c.

Privacy

There are two types of protected privacy interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment: (1) an individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, sometimes referred to as “informational privacy”296 and (2) “the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions,”297
sometimes known as “decisional privacy.”298 The informational privacy
right includes the right to keep private information containing specific
“details of one’s personal life”299 as well as information “which the
individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the private enclave where he

291. See generally Mottet, supra note 12, at 424.
292. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990).
293. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); see also Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
846 (1992).
294. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
295. See Mottet, supra note 12, at 424.
296. See, e.g., Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 1998).
297. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); see also Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977).
298. See Gonzalez v. Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327, 333 (D.P.R. 2018).
299. See Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 1991).
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may lead a private life,”300 and information containing “intimate facts of a
personal nature.”301
A federal district court recently addressed the informational privacy right
in the context of a challenge to Michigan’s policy for changing a gender
marker on a driver’s license. In Love v. Johnson,302 the court analyzed the
transgender plaintiffs’ challenge to a Michigan policy that required
providing a birth certificate with the transgender person’s corrected sex in
order to change one’s sex on a drivers license. The plaintiffs contended that
the surgical requirement to correct a birth certificate was onerous and unduly
burdensome and that those transgender people who could not or did not
desire to undertake GCS were thus forced—by the mismatch of their lived
gender identity and the gender markers on their driver’s license—to divulge
personal information in violation of the fundamental right to informational
privacy.303
The Court held that the right to informational private is limited to
“instances: (1) where the release of personal information could lead to bodily
harm . . . , and (2) where the information released was of a sexual, personal,
and humiliating nature.”304 Moreover, the plaintiff must allege that the
informational privacy asserted relates to a “fundamental liberty interest.”305
The Love plaintiffs contended that Michigan’s driver’s license policy
subjected them to bodily harm because it forced them to reveal their
transgender status to third-party strangers, which in turn put them in harm’s
way.306 The Court accepted those allegations to deny the defendant’s motion
to dismiss.307 In so holding, the Court noted that the Second Circuit has also
held that transgender people have a constitutional right to keep their
transgender status private as a matter of medical confidentiality.308 The Love
Court concluded that the policy, by requiring transgender people to reveal
that they are transgender, “directly implicates their fundamental right to

300.
301.
302.
303.

United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).
See id.
See Love v. Johnson, 146 F. Supp. 3d 848, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
See id. at 853; see also K.L. v. Div. of Motor Vehicles, Case No. 3AN-11-05431
CI, 2012 WL 2685183, at *3 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012).
304. See Johnson, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 853 (citing Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136
F.3d 1055, 1060 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also Bloch v. Riber, 156 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir.
1998).
305. See id. (quoting Bloch, 156 F.3d at 683).
306. See id. at 854
307. See id. at 855.
308. See id. (citing Powell v. Schriver, 175 F. 3d 107, 111 (2nd Cir. 1999)).
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privacy.”309
Having found a fundamental right that was implicated by the policy, the
Court next turned to the question of whether the policy furthered a
compelling state interest in a way that was narrowly tailored.310 The Court
rejected both of the state interests offered by the defendant: (1) “maintaining
accurate state identification documents” to “promote effective law
enforcement” and, (2) ensuring “that the information on the license is
consistent with other state records describing the individual.”311 It reasoned
that the policy of requiring an amended birth certificate was not the least
restrictive means by which to achieve the state’s asserted goals.312
Decisional privacy protects “the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions.”313 This category is limited to “matters
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
childrearing, and the like.”314 At least one court has found that this right
extends to one’s transgender status, holding that
[T]here are few areas which more closely intimate facts of a
personal nature” than one’s transgender status . . . . The decision of
who to tell and when to relate such information is an emotionally
sensitive area fraught with serious implications for that
individual. . . . . Disclosing that one is transgender involves a deep
personal choice which the government cannot compel, unless
disclosure furthers a valid public interest.315
These cases thus suggest that the surgical requirement violates the right to
both types of privacy. Because the surgical requirement is a bar for many
transgender people, particularly K-12 students due to cost, personal
preference, medical ineligibility, or the like, most transgender people in
states that require surgery before correcting a birth certificate are left with
mismatched identity documents. The mismatch between the gender marker
on the birth certificate and other identity documents, or the mismatch
between all identity documents and the transgender person’s everyday
gender presentation, forces disclosure of information that is protected by the
fundamental right to privacy, whether it is characterized as informational
privacy or decisional privacy. This is particularly true for K-12 students,
who have fewer identity documents than adults and who are required to
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See id. aat 856.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
See Gonzalez v. Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327, 333 (D.P.R. 2018).
See id. (internal citations omitted).
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present a birth certificate to enroll in public school. At the first moment that
a transgender K-12 student enters the public-school system, they are forced
to disclose this highly sensitive personal information that is protected by the
fundamental right to privacy.
2. The Surgical Requirement Violates Equal Protection Based on Sex and
Based on Transgender Status
An Equal Protection claim is made out when the state treats one group of
people differently than another, similarly-situated group of people in a
discriminatory manner.316 In the context of correcting the birth certificates,
the relevant groups are transgender people, for whom surgery is required
before obtaining a correct birth certificate, and cisgender people, who have
accurate birth certificates with no surgical requirement.317
The analysis of the Equal Protection claim will depend on how the groups
(classifications) are characterized; if the classification is held to be a sexbased one, then courts will apply intermediate scrutiny, pursuant to which
the state will have to demonstrate that the classification is justified by an
important government interest—an “exceedingly persuasive” justification—
that is substantially related to the surgical requirement.318 Several courts
have held that classifications based on transgender status are, in fact, sexbased classifications.319
Other courts have held that transgender people, by definition, constitute a
quasi-suspect class.320 The U.S. Supreme Court considers four factors when
deciding whether a group will be considered a quasi-suspect class: that the
group (1) has been “historically subjected to discrimination,” (2) has a
defining characteristic bearing no “relation to ability to perform or contribute
to society,” (3) has “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics,”
and (4) is “a minority or is politically powerless.”321 Courts have recognized
that there are persuasive arguments as to each of these four requirements322
316. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985).
317. See Mottet, supra note 12, at 422-23.
318. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 571-72 (1996).
319. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011).
320. See, e.g., F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1144-45 (D. Idaho 2018); see
also M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 719-21 (D. Md. 2018).;
Evancho, v. Pine–Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp.3d 267, 288, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017);
see also Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Educ., et al., 208
F. Supp. 3d 850, 873-74 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
321. See Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 1144 (internal citations omitted).
322. See Mottet, supra note 12, at 423, n.200.
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and some courts have so held.323
If the classification is not held to be sex-based, then a court will be tasked
with deciding what level of scrutiny transgender people, as a class, receive
under the equal protection framework. If a court holds that transgender
people are not members of a quasi-suspect class or a suspect class, then
rational basis review applies. As noted above, none of the state interests
proffered to support the surgical requirement satisfy this standard, either
because they are simply not legitimate state interests or, if they are
legitimate, the “fit”—the connection between the surgical requirement and
the state interest—is not strong enough.
E. State Antidiscrimination Law
Public accommodation antidiscrimination laws in nineteen states and the
District of Columbia explicitly include gender identity as a protected class;324
another two states have interpreted their public accommodation laws to
include protection based on gender identity.325 Of the twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia offering state-law protections from discrimination
based on gender identity, three have a surgical requirement to correct a birth
certificate—Iowa, Maine, and Michigan.326
In these states, these
antidiscrimination statutes provide another mechanism through which to
challenge the surgical requirement.
In such a challenge, the argument would be that the surgical requirement
is per se discrimination against transgender people in violation of the state
antidiscrimination law because the surgical requirement only applies to
transgender people seeking to correct the gender marker on their birth
certificates. This is plainly discrimination based on gender identity, which
is prohibited under the state law.
F. Informed Consent & Biomedical Ethics
While not binding on courts or legislatures, the bioethical principle of
323. See, e.g., Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 1144-45; M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 7192221; Evancho, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 288; Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist.,
208 F. Supp. 3d at 873-74.
324. See, Equality Maps: Nondiscrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT, [hereinafter Nondiscrimination Laws], http://www.lgbtmap.org/equalitymaps/non_discrimination_laws (last visited July 22, 2018) (California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington).
325. See id. (Michigan and New York).
326. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 13.
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informed consent underlies the legal concept of informed consent,327 a legal
doctrine that “changes what would otherwise be a tort and violation of
constitutional rights into a legitimate medical intervention.”328
One scholar has persuasively argued that the surgical requirement
amounts to state-sponsored coercion that vitiates the informed consent
doctrine.329 She contends that the tort concept of informed consent is
illuminated by the constitutional Due Process guaranty of privacy, and that
the alleged state interests in the medical model—preventing fraud, a
reluctance to assist persons with a mental disorder, and the belief that the
birth certificate is an historical record—do not justify violating the informed
consent doctrine.330
G. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that “even if a state has
absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the
privilege subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or
‘induce’ the waiver of constitutional rights.”331 When considering an
individual right, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that “on at
least some occasions receipt of a benefit to which someone has no
constitutional entitlement does not justify making that person abandon some
right guaranteed under the Constitution.”332 The doctrine thus embodies the
anti-totalitarian ethic that frames our entire constitutional democracy
because “[f]orcing citizens to choose between accepting government
327. See Silver, supra note 6, at 503-04 (citing that “[T]he doctrine of informed
consent serves four fundamental bioethical norms: respect for autonomy,
nonmaleficence, benefice, and justice.”).
328. See id. at 502.
329. See id. at 510-18.
330. Id. 514-15, 517-18 (“The intrusion into individual liberty significantly outweighs
such concerns. Genital surgery is highly invasive and concerns itself with an inherently
private choice intrinsically linked to identity. On balance, the governmental interests are
simply not compelling enough to justify such an extreme invasion into the right to
consent to or refuse medical treatment.”); see also Harper Jean Tobin, Against the
Surgical Requirement of Change of Legal Sex, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 393, 427
(2007) (“Bodily integrity is universally recognized as a fundamental human right, . . . .
[A] state violates that right by forcing individuals to undergo invasive medical
procedures. The state, however, should not force an individual to forgo one basic right
to enjoy another. This is precisely what states do whenever they make surgery a
prerequisite for gender recognition.”).
331. See Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (1988).
332. See id.
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benefits (or escaping harm) and exercising constitutional rights equates to a
denial of those rights.”333 These kinds of conditions alter the balance of
power between the government and individuals and diminish the individual’s
ability to maintain self-governing autonomy.
The doctrine has two parameters: first, the benefit (here, legal
reclassification of sex via correcting a birth certificate) “may not be directly
barred by independent constitutional grounds, nor can it be one that the
government is required to provide.”334 Second, the doctrine is only triggered
when a waiver of a constitutional right that implicates personal autonomy
(like the right to privacy) is required.335 Building on the notion that the
surgical requirement is coercive, Professor Silver reasons that it may be an
unconstitutional condition:
The right to refuse medical treatment is encompassed within the
right to privacy, and has been characterized as a liberty right. Such
a right is an autonomous choice that is normally within the
constitutionally protected discretion of an individual. Thus, the
right to decide what medical treatments are required to express
gender, and the right to refuse treatments unwanted by a patient, is
a constitutionally protected right.336
She then contends that the surgical requirement is an indirect burden on
the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, which should be
analyzed within the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as if it were a direct
burden on that right, triggering strict scrutiny.337 The surgical requirement
would fail strict scrutiny because a “rigid system that compels highly
invasive and permanent body alteration is unlikely to be considered
‘narrowly tailored’ or the least restrictive method of protecting whatever
governmental interest is at stake.”338
Another scholar frames the unconstitutional conditions dilemma in this
context as pitting the choice of unwanted surgery against the right to define
one’s own identity.339 Because constructing identity, including gender
identity, is the central, defining characteristic of one’s autonomy, the
“Constitution’s anti-totalitarian principle prohibits state interjection into
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See generally Ruocco, supra note 12, at 217.
See generally Silver, supra note 6, at 519.
See id. at 520.
See id.
See id.
See id. (“[N]o governmental interest promoted by the medical model is as
compelling as the interest in life, public safety, or the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.”).
339. See Ruocco, supra note 12, at 218.
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identity-formation.”340 Put another way, compelling transgender people to
be undergo surgery in order to get a correct birth certificate is
totalitarianism.341
H. Title IX, Transgender Students, and Corrected Birth Certificates
As has been described above, the surgical requirement is particularly
burdensome for K-12 transgender students and their birth certificates are
uniquely important in the school context.342 As long as schools continue to
rely on a transgender student’s birth certificate to decide which sexsegregated facilities that student will be allowed to use, the surgical
requirement will continue to harm transgender students by erecting a total
bar for the students to satisfy the school’s restroom-based-on-birthcertificate policy. For these reasons, eliminating the surgical requirement for
correcting birth certificates is of vital importance not only to transgender
adults, but also to transgender K-12 students. Eliminating the surgical
requirement—and permitting the correction of a birth certificate by court
order or letter from a treating physician or therapist stating that correcting
the birth certificate is part of the appropriate treatment, along with an
acknowledgement of an understanding that correcting the birth certificate
operates as a change of legal sex for all purposes—would allow transgender
students to avoid lengthy, costly, and emotionally grueling fights with school
districts both in the schoolhouse and the courthouse.
Because of the unique importance of birth certificates for K-12
transgender students, the next section advocates for the creation of an
intentional and strategic coalition between the gender marker correction
movement and the Title IX and transgender students movement. Failure to
work cooperatively in a strategic coalition likely will increase what Professor
Marie-Amelie George has identified as the “LGBT disconnect.”343
IV. MITIGATING THE LGBT DISCONNECT THROUGH FORMAL IDENTITY
Now that that major hurdle of securing fundamental constitutional rights
for queer adults has been secured, it is time to refocus part of the “gay
agenda” on our own children, ensuring their fundamental constitutional
340. See id. at 218-19.
341. See id. (“Defining gender is at the core of autonomy: individuals must be able to

choose their identity or opt out of the gender system. Otherwise, they are submerged
beneath the State.”).
342. See generally Vincent J. Samar, The Right to Privacy and the Right to Use the
Bathroom Consistent with One’s Gender Identity, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 33,
57 (2016).
343. See generally George, supra note 1, at 503.
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rights are enshrined by public schools systems serving a democratic . . .
republic.344

A. The Strategic Benefits of a Coalition
An intentional coalition between the gender marker correction and the
Title IX and transgender student movements provides benefits to both
groups. Children lack political power. They cannot vote. They have limited
rights.345 Politicians are thus not beholden to their child-constituents as they
are to the adult constituents.346 For the Title IX and transgender student
movement, the gender marker correction movement thus brings a political
agency that is lacking in the Title IX movement because the latter movement
is largely led by adult transgender people. These adults may vote, lobby,
organize, disseminate information, rally, and engage in political and legal
processes with relative ease.347 The adults that comprise the gender marker
correction movement thus bring a voice to transgender children toward the
common goal of removing the surgical requirement for correcting birth
certificates. They give transgender children a political boost.
Transgender adults are some of the most marginalized in our society. A
majority of Americans do not know a transgender person.348 Many
Americans harbor disgust, animus, or fear toward transgender adults.
Conservative politicians fuel these fears and biases by using campaign
materials that pathologize and criminalize transgender lives. Children, in
contrast, are largely seen differently by American society—as vulnerable, in
need of protection, as pure and innocent. They are often cute; their stories
can be more powerful than the stories of adults by pulling on the listener’s
heartstrings. Adults generally do not fear children.349 This common
344. See Murphy, supra note 69, at 98.
345. See, e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery:

Children’s Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 12-15 (1994) (asserting that
of course, supportive cisgender parents may use the political process to advocate for their
transgender children, but even then—as a child’s issue—lawmakers may continue to give
the issue short shrift).
346. See id., at 17 (“Children’s claims to our care and concern are not childish or
inferior, of course, but so long as they serve no politically powerful adult purpose, those
claims remain unvoiced.”).
347. While transgender adults may not form a politically powerful bloc given their
generally marginalized status, they certainly have more access to political and legal
processes than transgender children do.
348. See George, supra note 1, at 573.
349. But cf. Sandra E. Garcia, Black Boys Feel Less Safe in White Neighborhoods,
Study Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018) (noting that a glaring exception to this
generality is the fear that many white people harbor about African-American boys).
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perception of the American child benefits transgender children. It is much
more difficult for a politician to malign a six-year-old transgender child
seeking to socially transition than it is to pathologize and criminalize
transgender adults, particularly if that child tells a story of bullying and
harassment at school. The children of the Title IX movement may thus give
the gender marker correction movement a “reputation boost.”
Simply put, it is likely that these two groups will be stronger and more
successful working together to overturn the surgical requirement to correct
birth certificates. This is true even if the number of transgender children for
whom a corrected birth certificate is clinically appropriate is small;350 their
mere presence in the coalition will amplify the messages of both groups more
powerfully and highlight more clearly the challenges faced by all transgender
people.
However, one important piece of the strategy is still missing; getting the
national LGBT-rights organizations getting on board. That issue is discussed
below.
B. Collaboration and Coalition-Building: Avoiding Further Disconnect
in the LGBT Civil Rights Movement
Professor George argues that there is an “LGBT disconnect,” a dilemma
facing the LGBT civil rights movement in which “lesbian, gay, and
transgender rights are sufficiently disconnected that many Americans are
willing to accept the former (LG) and not the latter (T), and yet the two are
integrated enough that one can be deployed against the other.”351 Her
extensive survey of historical sources, from the local to the national levels,
taken over several decades reveals that while the national LGBT rights
organizations formally and publicly include transgender rights on their
agendas, “their strategies unintentionally created an internal hierarchy of
interests, with gender conforming gays and lesbians at the top.”352 Giving
primacy to the legal goals of gender conforming gays and lesbians—such as
marriage equality and access to the military—has resulted in legal victories
and thus enhanced freedoms for this small slice of the LGBT community,
namely heteronormative lesbians and gay men.353 But the victories came at
a cost to the transgender segment of the community.
The strategy to win the rights for gays and lesbians was one of
assimilation—for example, making gay and lesbian couples come across
350.
351.
352.
353.

See supra Part I.
See generally George, supra note 1, at 506.
See id.
See id at 506-07.
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“just like” middle-class heterosexual couples, or making gay and lesbian
soldiers come across as just as patriotic as heterosexual soldiers.354 These
assimilationist strategies do not translate well to the fight for transgender
people’s rights; as a result, these issues often were left by the wayside of the
movement.355 Thus, although the “LGBT” acronym is well known to the
general population, most Americans are knowledgeable about and tolerant
of (if not comfortable with) gays and lesbians, but not transgender people.356
This discomfort with transgender people bleeds over into the continuing
cultural and legal battles over lesbian and gay issues such that opponents of
gay and lesbian rights now use the fact that the “T” is part of “LGBT” to
leverage transgender issues—most typically, the restroom issue—to fight not
only against “T” rights, but to dismantle the rights won for the “G” and the
“L.”357 As a result, everyone loses.358
Professor George uses the passage of H.B. 2, North Carolina’s “bathroom
bill,” as one example of the disconnect in action: it was expressly targeted at
transgender people, but it also repealed all local ordinances that offered wage
and other labor protections.359 Another example is the repeal of Houston’s
anti-discrimination ordinance, which provided protection to access to public
accommodations based on gender identity but also on a host of other
protected classes, including sexual orientation, pregnancy, and the like.360
Professor George concludes that “the disconnect between Americans’
support for gay and lesbian rights on the one hand, and transgender rights on
the other, has been extremely harmful to the LGBT movement as a whole.”361
In essence, anti-gay and lesbian people, who are also anti-transgender, can
achieve the results of “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” when they
leverage society’s transphobia to pass laws that explicitly harm transgender
people and also to pass laws that harm gays and lesbians.
After describing the disconnect, Professor George connects it to social
movement theory, which posits there are two levels of decision-making:
goals and strategies, where both offer potential for dissent within a

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

See id. at 5.
See id. at 533, 558, 570-71.
See id. at 561.
See id. at 510, 526.
See id. at 507.
See id. at 505-06, 517.
See Justin Wm. Moyer, Why Houston’s gay rights ordinance failed: Fear of men
in women’s bathrooms, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2015).
361. See George, supra note 1, at 512.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019

57

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 5

86

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27

movement.362 Goals are chosen at the outset and reflect the normative
choices of a movement.363 Strategy is the second level, which is chosen after
the goals are set, and is another site of intra-movement conflict.364 Strategic
decisions include “whether to seek legislative, administrative, or judicial
remedies, or later issues of what remedies to accept.”365 The assimilationist
goals-and-strategy approach by national LGBT rights groups created the
LGBT disconnect we see today: while the movement’s stated goals have
included transgender rights since 2007, its strategies ended up leaving
transgender rights largely by the wayside.366
Professor George offers three possible approaches for national LGBT
rights organizations to mitigate the disconnect: “abandoning transgender
rights from their mandate, pursuing an assimilationist transgender rights
strategy, and/or transforming their tactics to emphasize all LGBT
individuals’ gender non-conformity.”367
This Article asserts that two segments of the LGBT rights movement—
that segment pursuing an end to the surgical requirement and that segment
seeking access to gender-affirming restrooms for K-12 transgender
students—have an opportunity to be intentional about the overlap of their
causes and thus to be aligned in both their goals and strategies. Building on
George’s notion of disconnect, national LGBT organizations have the
opportunity to band together with these two segments of the community,
with the intended result of mitigating the disconnect. The former segment
seeks easier access to identity documents for transgender people most often,
though not always,368 for transgender adults; the latter segment seeks access
for transgender students to gender-affirming sex-segregated facilities in K12 schools. The “L,” “G,” and “B” segments of the community, as
represented by national LGBT organizations in particular, are at a crossroads
concerning the future of the movement; they must face the disconnect headon and make decisions about how to mitigate it.369
For all the reasons explained herein, the synergies between these two
362. See id. at 558.
363. See id. (using the examples of the Civil Rights movement choosing integration

over uniform education funding and the LGBT rights movement choosing to seek
marriage equality rather than seeking to have non-marital relationships recognized, as
examples of such goals that were contested within their respective movements).
364. See id.
365. See id. at 558-59.
366. See id. at 507, 558.
367. See id. at 575.
368. See e.g. Complaint, B.D., supra note 10, at 2.
369. See George, supra note 1, at 573-75.
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segments of the transgender rights movement cry out for a strategic alliance
to strive toward a common goal that benefits both. This Article further agrees
with George that gay men, lesbians, and bisexual people will benefit if
national LGBT-rights organizations actually implement strategies to achieve
the stated goal of transgender rights,370 and as a result contends that national
organizations should work with these two segments of the community to
develop strategies to achieve the goal shared by these two segments—the
abolishment of the surgical requirement to obtain a corrected birth
certificate.
Mitigating the disconnect by truly partnering with these two segments of
the community has the potential to benefit LGB people as well as the two
specific segments of the community at which the effort is aimed.371 For
example, such partnering likely will help LGB people who assert claims of
employment discrimination under Title VII.372 While that statute does not
explicitly protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation or
gender identity, some courts have held that LGBT litigants may state a claim
under the law based on the “sex stereotyping” theory set forth in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.373 However, some courts have limited claims to
lesbians who appear “butch” and gay men who appear “effeminate”—in
other words, “only those who physically manifested their sexual orientation”
can state a Title VII claim.374 Including transgender people in the LGBTrights movement’s strategies thus “would help produce a thicker set of rights
by challenging anti-LGBT assumptions and stereotypes, especially norms
about how men and women should be.”375
This Article advocates for use of the assimilationist approach, pursuant to
which LGBT-rights groups would highlight the ways that transgender people
are similar to their cisgender counterparts. In the context of the surgical
requirement and birth certificate issues, the assimilationist approach would
mean that “LGBT rights lawyers . . . would lobby for simple procedures that
permit transgender individuals to change their gender designation from male
to female, and vice versa, without undergoing genital surgery.”376
370. See id.at 563-64.
371. See id. at 563 (explaining that gays and lesbians benefit, albeit arguably

indirectly, from including transgender rights in the movement: “[I]ncluding transgender
individuals would help produce a thicker set of rights by challenging anti-LGBT
assumptions and stereotypes”).
372. See id. at 562-64.
373. See id. at 562 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.228 (1989)).
374. See id.
375. See id. at 563.
376. See id. at 390-91 (“Lawyers following the transformative strategy would argue

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019

59

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 5

88

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27

Concretely, the movement could utilize images and interviews with
transgender people, both adults and children, who have chosen not to
undergo GCS but whose gender presentation is unmistakably aligned with
their gender identity. Images of such non-GCS transgender people who fully
“pass” in living their gender identity resonate strongly with cisgender people;
these transgender people who look like “real” men and “real” women appeal
the cisgender people’s gender norm expectations (i.e., to the gender binary).
Such images thus make it more understandable why non-GCS transgender
people should have access to a birth certificate amendment process that does
not require surgery, and thus access to gender-affirming restrooms without a
surgical requirement.377
There are, of course, normative and legal consequences of utilizing the
assimilation approach. The potential negative consequences of the
assimilation strategy—in which lesbian and gay people would stress that
discrimination against them is, at its core, based on their gender nonconformity378—is the risk that “emphasizing gender non-conformity erodes
some of the boundaries between male and female” in ways that increase
cultural anxiety about LGBT rights writ large, thereby putting recent gains
as risk of repeal.379 Furthermore, by advocating through a trans normative
lens, the assimilationist approach erases genderqueer people and their legal
obstacles, as well as reinforces the false notion of a gender binary.380
The positive impact of the assimilationist strategy is that it has the
potential to unite the movement in that we are “stronger together,” have
access to more resources to fight these two particular battles, and to send a
message to the broader society about the place of transgender people, and in
particular transgender children, in our communities and laws. Finally,
advocating for transgender students can make the lives of transgender
students and gay, lesbian and bisexual students better, thus benefiting all of
the letters of the LGBT label:
By advocating for transgender students’ right to use the bathroom
consistent with their gender identity, the discordant LGBT
community can find success and equality both for these students
and for the broader LGBT public. This issue goes beyond
that many identity documents do not need gender markers, and thus advocate for their
removal. Should that fail, their next best solution would be a gender-neutral option for
their clients.”).”
377. See id. at 580-81 (describing the transnormative assimilationist approach taken
by LGBT-rights organizers fighting a “bathroom bill” in Alaska).
378. See id.at 581.
379. See id. at 588-89.
380. See id. at 571-72.
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permitting transgender students to use the proper bathroom and
goes toward the need to secure safety in unsupervised spaces for all
LGBT students in schools.381
In sum, the disconnect described by George may be mitigated by national
LGBT rights organizations increasing their attention to and support of this
particular transgender rights issue—abolishing the surgical requirement for
gender marker correction on birth certificates. By helping to create, and then
by joining, the coalition between these two segments of the transgender
population, the “L,” “G,” and “B” segments of the community will facilitate
a greater understanding of who transgender people are, as well as make
transgender rights more intelligible to the general population. As a result of
this increased understanding and who transgender people are and why this
particular type of discrimination against them is harmful and misplaced, the
mainstream LGBT rights movement could thus help normalize transgender
people. That normalization, in turn, makes it more difficult for opponents of
equality to leverage anti-transgender rhetoric to harm not only transgender
people but also gay, lesbian, and bisexual people.
C. “Formal Identity” Is a Beneficial Common Goal
In her article Identity and Form, Professor Jessica Clarke posits that recent
legal battles implicating identity claims, including claims by transgender
people to use gender-affirming sex-segregated facilities, might be resolved
by adopting what she calls “formal identity”—the process by which the law
would recognize legal sex by utilizing the execution of formalities. A
transgender person’s self-identified gender identity would be reflected on a
corrected birth certificate as long as that person fulfilled the required
formalities.382
She proposes formal identity as a means to remedy the shortcomings of
the two predominant models of identity: the ascriptive model, which uses
biology and social measures that are considered objective to ascribe identity,
and the elective model, through which individuals self-identify.383 She
borrows the concept of formalities, which include both the documentary and
the ceremonial,384 from the field of contract law, specifically from
Consideration and Form by Lon Fuller.385 In that classic writing, Fuller set
forth three functions of legal formalities—evidentiary (proving the
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

See generally Jereb, supra note 12, at 586-87.
See generally Clarke, supra note 18, at 750.
See id. at 751.
See id. at 750.
See id. at 751 (citing Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
799, 800-01 (1941)).
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underlying claim’s validity), cautionary (providing warning to the party
about the gravity of their claim), and channeling (“ensuring that everyone
understands and can organize their behavior around a clear distinction”).386
The formalities proposed by Clarke, building on Fuller, are “practices used
to render a legal status an official designation[,]”387 such that formal identity
is “one that comes into being through the execution of a formality by the
parties laying claim to a particular identity.”388
In the context of birth certification correction for transgender people,
Clarke explains:
Consider, for example, a requirement that a person designated male
at birth change her birth certificate if she wishes for the law to
recognize her as a woman. This requirement serves the evidentiary
purpose of providing ready proof of her sex in the event of future
controversies. It serves the cautionary purpose of ensuring that she
has fully considered her choice and is serious enough about it to
follow the requisite bureaucratic procedure for changing a birth
certificate. And it serves the channeling purpose of making clear
that if she fails to change her birth certificate, the law will continue
to recognize her as a man rather than a woman.389
Courts and other state actors, such as public school officials, utilize what
Clarke calls “identity determination doctrines—the legal frameworks
used . . . to determine whether a particular group status . . . should be
attributed to an individual.”390 In most contexts, including the context of
transgender K-12 students, school officials rely on the student’s birth
certificate as the controlling identity determination doctrine to resolve the
student’s legal sex,391 which in turn informs the school official’s decision
about which restroom the transgender student will be permitted to use.
While the birth certificate produced at birth is not the type of formal identity
imagined by Clarke (because it is ascribed at birth based on the allegedly
objective criterion of external genitalia), the corrected birth certificate that is
the focus of this Article is encompassed in Clarke’s notion of formal identity
because it argues that once corrected through administrative formalities that

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

See id.
See id. at 769.
See id. at 770.
See id. at 751-52.
See id. at 754.
See generally Allison S. Bohm et al., Challenges Facing LGBT Youth, 17 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 125, 143 (2016) (noting that four state athletic associations “require
transgender students to participate on the sports team that aligns with the sex listed on
their birth certificate.”).
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do not include surgical requirements, the corrected birth certificate should be
accepted without pause or challenge as the certificate holder’s legal sex.392
This is the evidentiary function of the birth certificate formality in action.393
Constituting legal sex through formal identity makes the determination of
legal sex simple and straightforward for officials tasked with determining
legal sex for the purposes of access to sex-segregated facilities.394
While there certainly are downsides to adopting the formal identity model,
particularly the potential obstacles based on class395 and transphobia,396 as
well as the potential for legitimation of gender as binary,397 this Article
agrees with Clarke’s proposal for formal identity and its benefits and thus
adopts it, though not to the exclusion of other models. It builds on Clarke’s
proposal by arguing that the administrative formalities required for birth
392. See Clarke, supra note 18, at 769 (“A theory of formal identity might support
enforcement of sex designation changes.”). This Article takes Clarke’s position further
to argue that formal identity through corrected birth certificates should be dispositive to
the determination of legal sex.
393. See id. at 751.
394. See id. at 799 (“When recognized by the law, formal sex may allow . . .
transgender individuals to achieve recognition and challenge the equation of certain
biological traits with gender identities, norms, and stereotypes. Administrative and even
medical treatment requirements for changes to sex designations might be understood as
formalities, intended to ensure that individuals consider their decisions with caution, and
to channel them into one of two binary identities, male or female, enabling sexsegregated institutions to readily categorize them without having to engage in debates
about ascriptive versus elective meanings.”).
395. See id. at 752-53 (describing the ways in which “requiring formality may
perpetuate systems of inequality linked to identity status”); id. at 812 (“[R]ules requiring
surgery or hormone therapy as prerequisites to birth certificate changes have operated to
commodify sexual identity for many transgender persons unable to afford medical
treatment.”).
396. See generally Clarke, supra note 18, at 817 (noting that “[s]elective
formalization may be discriminatory when those who do not meet ascriptive standards
do not have the option to formalize their identities. When the formality is a state-issued
license, the government may establish barriers that require individuals to meet certain
ascriptive definitions before they may apply.”) Clarke also illustrates the potential for
discrimination with an example involving a transgender man who is required to have a
mastectomy before being permitted to correct his birth certificate and notes that in this
example, “ascriptive definitions play a leading role and formality is backstage. Formality
merely moves the question of ascriptive meaning one level back, to the licensing
authority. Yet the selectivity of these formalities may be forgotten in legal discussions.”
Id.
397. See id. at 827 (quoting Spade, supra note 12, at 738) (“Professor Spade has
argued that ‘administrative classification of identities does invisible work of naturalizing
categories of classification, inviting the question: Why is gender identification taken for
granted as a legitimate domain of governance?’”).
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certificate corrections should not, and as a matter of constitutional law
cannot, include a surgical requirement. Instead, the only requirement needed
to trigger the administrative formality of correcting a birth certificate should
be a court order or letter from a doctor, psychologist, or other treating
professional that states that correcting the person’s birth certificate is a
necessary part of the person’s transition, which is a clinically necessary part
of the person’s gender dysphoria treatment.398 Additionally, if executing the
formalities of correcting one’s birth certificate is made mandatory before
becoming a transgender person’s legal sex for all purposes, access to the
formalities process must be ensured for all transgender people. This need for
access for all is necessary so that historical barriers to GCS (and other
surgeries), such as socioeconomic status and geographic location, are not r
by the adoption of the formal identity model.
In sum, the formal identity model advocated here is one that does not
include a surgical requirement and one that ensures access to the model’s
formality requirements.399 This version of formal identity offers the
advantages of relative simplicity, administrative ease, and clarity, along with
the three advantages articulated by Fuller and supported by Clarke.400 The
potential challenges, of course, are actually ensuring access to courts or
clinicians for all transgender people who want to execute the formalities and
countering arguments that the process may be too easy, such that people may
seek to change their birth certificates more than once, which may lead to
confusion.401 With regard to the concern about multiple changes and the
resulting confusion, available data show that such situations are rare,
particularly for adolescents.402 Even though the situation might be more
common for prepubescent youth who correct their birth certificates,403 the
goal of accuracy in public health records should take precedence over fear
that there could be a subsequent correction. Moreover, the SOC recommend
that all gender-questioning youth be supported by parents and caregivers
regardless of whether those youth ultimately identify as transgender.404
Offering the opportunity, through the formal identity model, for these
398. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103430 (West 2018) (requiring
an affidavit from a doctor that correcting the birth certificate is “clinically appropriate
treatment for the purpose of gender transition . . . .”).
399. See Clarke, supra note 18, at 795 (noting some states’ rejection of surgical
requirements).
400. See id. at 807 (asserting that formal identity does have advantages).
401. See id. at 835.
402. See WPATH SOC, supra note 16 at 12.
403. See supra Part I.
404. See generally Singal, supra note 55.
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children to correct their birth certificates before puberty so they can explore
social transition at school would lead to healthier mental health outcomes for
gender-questioning youth—those who ultimately transition and those who
do not. The same can be said for the youth whose gender identity journey
ends with an alignment of their body with their sex assigned at birth:
permitting them to correct their birth certificate a second time will lead to
positive mental health outcomes, which in turn means more healthy adults
able to contribute to and engage with larger society.405
D. A Note on the Scope of this Proposal
A note on the scope and reach of this Article: while it proposes a narrow
solution to the issue of restroom use that will have utility for some, but not
all, transgender K-12 students,406 that solution is not intended to be the
singular solution, nor is it offered as the ideal solution. Scholars have
persuasively argued that self-identification, standing alone, should be
sufficient to determine legal sex and thus to correct a birth certificate,407 a
position with which I agree. Other scholars have made convincing arguments
that because gender as a category is fluid and unstable,408 the use of gender
markers by the administrative state should be eradicated or limited, or that
birth registration and birth certificates should be disaggregated409—positions
that I also agree with.410 All of these arguments and proposals offer the
benefit of increasing liberty by increasing individual agency and autonomy
or by dismantling a false binary that limits the freedoms of everyone, not just
transgender people.411 However, I consider these arguments to be more
aspirational than pragmatic given the current legal and political climate.
While I wholeheartedly support legal scholarship articulating aspirational
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

See generally id.
See Part I.D.1 and 3.
See, e.g., Matambanadzo, supra note 12, at 242-44.
See Ruocco, supra note 12, at 206.
See Appell, supra note 12, at 404.
See Ruocco, supra note 12, at 219-21 (arguing that the state “must eliminate or
limit the use of legal gender” based on the constitution’s promise of anti-totalitarianism
and that the state must accept self-identification of gender identity, as it currently does
for self-identified religious beliefs); see also Wipfler, supra note 12, at 523-24 (arguing
for the elimination of sex as a category in government documents).
411. See Appell, supra note 12, at 377-78 (“[T]he birth certificate’s promotion and
reification of gender is among its fundamental foci . . . . There is no place (box) for
ambiguity. In this way, the birth certificate constructs sex as biological, fixed, and binary.
There are only two sexes from which to choose and a person can only select one. The
certificate fails to acknowledge any other sex categories, such as intersex, undecided,
androgynous, or ambiguous.”).
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projects grounded in feminist,412 queer,413 and critical theories,414 and have
engaged in such projects myself,415 this Article is decidedly pragmatic—it
proposes a practical solution situated within an existing and deeply
entrenched understanding and acceptance of (1) gender as binary and (2) the
execution of formalities to create legal rights, obligations, and categories. By
proposing a solution grounded in popular (albeit it cramped and contrary to
science) understandings of gender and the functioning of the administrative
state, this Article’s goal is to provide more immediate relief for K-12
transgender students while the important, more aspirational theoretical and
doctrinal work continues. It largely proposes an assimilationist and trans
normative approach.416 This Article is thus meant to supplement, not
supplant, the parallel projects dismantling the legal gender binary and
promoting self-identification as legally dispositive for the recognition of a
person’s legal sex.
CONCLUSION
There is much at stake, both individually for these transgender students
and for our shared commitment to formal equality. The literal lives of
transgender students hang in the balance. Moreover, the resiliency of our
foundational commitment to equality, privacy, and liberty is at stake and
must be fortified and reinforced by exposing the constitutional flaws of both
birth certificate policies and interpretations of Title IX that exclude
protections for transgender students. The way the state channels rights and
protections to animate notions of liberty and equality is of paramount
importance on both structural and individual levels. This Article has
explored how these two legal and social institutions—birth certificates and
Title IX—are tied together and attempt to help illuminate the path to victory
for both.
412. See, e.g., Matambanadzo, supra note 12, at 234.
413. See Appell, supra note 12, at 404 (“This commitment to binary sex

identification . . . helps to create and facilitate heteronormativity in a variety of ways.”).
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